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Prejudicial Interpretation of Expert
Reliability on the Cutting Edge Enables
the Orthopaedic Implant Industrys
Bodily Eminent Domain Claim
Frank Griffin, M.D., J.D.*
Failure of judicial gatekeepers to accurately assess
reliability of expert witness testimony under Daubert in
orthopaedic device defective design cases is creating an artificial
and unreasonable barrier to recovery for a uniquely vulnerable
patient population. Tendencies to ignore major conflicts of
interest and overemphasize systematically biased epidemiology
studies while excluding novel research in preparation for trial
and personal experience experts give industry a decisive
advantage. Consequently, the orthopaedic implant industry uses
the less rigorous substantial equivalence pathway to
orthopaedic device approval at markedly higher rates than non-
orthopaedic medical devices, resulting in a much higher device
recall rate with resultant costs to the public. Current judicial
trends facilitate a kind of bodily eminent domain claim by
industry resulting in an unnecessary and costly taking of
Americans health.
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Striving to better, oft we mar whats well. William
Shakespeare.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The orthopaedic device industry has revolutionized the
treatment of many musculoskeletal problems with devices from
bone plates to total knee replacements restoring function and
quality to patients lives. For example, over 90% of patients
using any of several types of total hip or knee replacements
placed in use by the 1980s had good or excellent outcomes
lasting at least fifteen to twenty years.2 Today, the orthopaedic
device industry is a multibillion dollar industry generating over
$43 billion annually in worldwide revenues, with over 60%
generated in the United States alone.3 As with any big
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 4 (Jay L. Halio ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press updated ed. 2005).
2. See, e.g., David R. Diduch & John N. Insall et al., Total Knee
Replacement in Young, Active Patients: Long-Term Follow-Up and Functional
Outcome, 79A J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY AM. 575 (1997); Lars Neumann et
al., Long-Term Results of Charnley Total Hip Replacement: Review of 92
Patients at 15 to 20 Years, 76B J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY BRIT. 245 (1994).
3. ORTHOKNOW, STRATEGIC INSIGHTS INTO THE ORTHOPAEDIC INDUSTRY
1 (2012). The top three orthopaedic device companies have market caps of JNJ
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business, competitiveness and innovation are keys to
maintaining or improving market share.4 From the latest
iPhone to self-driving cars to the latest total knee replacement,
Americans want the latest and greatest advancements.
But what happens when an advancement is not really an
innovation or improvement at all? What if the enemy of good
is better,5 and the new device has worse outcomes than its
predecessor? What if the failed advancement is more of a
marketing ploy with minimal scientific foundation advanced by
a company to gain market share rather than to improve patient
outcomes?
Orthopaedic device manufacturers may feel justified in
taking liberties with patients health to stake claim to the
cutting edge if the likelihood of negative business
consequences is small.6 Some in medicine openly espouse the
idea that it is okay to take liberties with patients health to
benefit others; in order for medical students and residents to
learn, some argue that it is necessary for young doctors to avoid
disclosure of inexperience, in what is known as the physicians
dodge.7 A prominent physician author says, [l]earning must
be stolen, taken as a kind of bodily eminent domain.8 But
$293.3B, SYK $38.44B, and ZBH $19.93B. See Johnson & Johnson, N.Y.
STOCK EXCH. (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.google.com/finance?q=NYSE:JNJ.
4. See generally Peter W. Roberts, Product Innovation, Product-Market
Competition and Persistent Profitability in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry,
20 STRAT. MGMT. J. 655 (1999) (outlining how strategy and innovation drive
persistent profits in the pharmaceutical industry).
5. This is an English variant of Italian proverb popularized by Voltaire
in the 1600s. See SUSAN RATCLIFFE, OXFORD CONCISE DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS 389 (6th ed. 2011).
6. See Tarek Salaway et al., Technology in Surgery and the Future of
Integrated Care, INFECTION CONTROL & CLINICAL QUALITY (Feb. 24, 2016),
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/quality/technology-in-surgery-and-the-
future-of-integrated-care.html (The evolving technological sophistication of a
hospital, and the degree to which that technology is perceived to enhance
patient outcomes remains one of the key factors that attract patients to it and
its programs.); see also Andrew M. Seaman, Adoption of New Surgical
Technology Linked to Complications, REUTERS (July 8, 2014, 2:53 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-surgery-devices-complications-
idUSKBN0FD26T20140708 (Patients may be more likely to have
complications when a new surgical device is first being adopted, suggests a
new study looking at prostate removal.).
7. ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEONS NOTES ON AN
IMPERFECT SCIENCE 3233 (2002) (illustrating how the relative inexperience
of a physician can be intentionally unspoken).
8. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
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should such a bodily eminent domain claim extend to the
orthopaedic device industry?9
This paper explores the idea that current design defect law
enables the orthopaedic device industry to stake an eminent
domain-like claim on patients health in the United States.10
First, allegations by a prominent orthopaedic leader that the
device industry is actually controlling orthopaedic medicine
such that medicine is nothing more than a marketing arm of
industry will be explored because, if true, the court system is
facing a particularly vulnerable patient population worthy of
judicial attention.11 Second, the current application of design
defect law to orthopaedic implant cases will be explored with
particular attention to two total joint replacement devices
recently in the news,12 and prejudicial judicial tendencies that
may embolden aggressive industry practices will be discussed.
Finally, the desirability of the courts protecting a vulnerable
population by shifting the risks associated with implant design
decisions onto device manufacturers and away from doctors,
patients, and society as a whole is explored.
II. WAG THE DOG: THE ORTHOPAEDIC IMPLANT
INDUSTRY PRESENTS A UNIQUE PROBLEM FOR THE
COURT SYSTEM
The orthopaedic device industry presents a unique problem
to the courts because there is evidence that the industry may
be controlling medicineinstead of vice versa. Orthopaedic
surgery is heavily dependent upon the device industry. In 2003,
Professor Augusto Sarmiento wrote that, medicine has become
a tool that functions primarily as a marketing arm of industry
with patient welfare . . . little more than a desirable (but not
9. For an alternative viewpoint regarding physician disclosure
obligationsdiscussing informed consent doctrinesee, e.g., Lucas v. Awaad,
830 N.W.2d 141, 15051 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
10. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW
INST. 1998). This paper is limited to a discussion of defective in design
without consideration of manufacturing defects, failure to warn, or warranty
issues.
11. AUGUSTO SARMIENTO, BARE BONES: A SURGEONS TALE: THE PRICE OF
SUCCESS IN AMERICANMEDICINE 284 (2003).
12. The author does not assert that any of the devices mentioned in this
paper are defective in designthat is a question only juries can decide, when
informed properly by experts in the field.
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essential) byproduct.13 Sarmiento is a former president of the
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (the worlds
largest medical association of musculoskeletal specialists now
with over 39,000 members worldwide)14 and former chairman
of the Department of Orthopaedic Surgery at the University of
Southern California. Sarmiento continued, I feel comfortable
in stating that the education of todays orthopedists is
structured, to a great extent, to satisfy the marketing needs of
industry.15 Sarmiento adds that orthopaedic residency
students simply use the educational system to learn to use
industrys tools.16 The dependence of orthopaedic residents on
industry representatives can be shocking, with one sales
representative saying, It sounds ridiculous, because heres a
guy who went to medical school and residency, and hes
listening to some guy in the back of the room.17 Another sales
rep added, Its not uncommon to have a surgeon with a drill in
his hand, about to drill a hole, looking over his shoulder at you
saying, Is this right?18 The culture of orthopaedic surgeons
may also play a role with orthopaedic surgeons having a
reputation as predominantly male and the jocks of the
surgical world with a particular willingness to use devices in
unapproved ways,19 and likely, by extension, to use devices
that are new rather than better.
Evidence that suggests that Sarmientos assessment that
the industry tail is wagging the proverbial orthopaedic dog
is accurate includes (A) signs of abuse or corruption including
fines, settlements, and prison terms in the orthopaedic
industry,20 (B) unexplainable striking shifts away from
proven devices to new devices with ultimately worse
outcomes,21 and (C) disproportionate use of shortcut regulatory
13. SARMIENTO, supra note 11, at 284 (emphasis added).
14. Background, AM. ACAD. OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, http://www.aaos
.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=1604 (last visited Oct. 4, 2016).
15. SARMIENTO, supra note 11, at 284 (emphasis added).
16. Id.
17. Mina Kimes, Bad to the Bone: A Medical Horror Story, FORTUNE
(Sept. 18, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2012/09/18/bad-to-the-bone-a-
medical-horror-story.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See the discussion infra Part II.A.
21. See the discussion infra Part II.B.
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pathways to device clearance in spite of public outcry from
respected voices demanding change.22
A. SIGNS OF ABUSE/CORRUPTION IN THE INDUSTRY: DOJ FINES,
SETTLEMENTS, AND PRISON
An environment of alleged kickbacks, settlements, off-
label promotion, and prison sentences suggests that the
orthopaedic device industry is willing to take liberties to
control the marketplace for profit. In 2007, criminal complaints
were settled against four orthopaedic implant companies
alleging that they were paying surgeons to use their devices in
violation of the federal anti-kickback laws.23 A fifth company,
Stryker®, cooperated with the investigation and was not
included.24 Those five companies together controlled 88% of the
U.S. total joint replacement market.25 Ultimately, the four
companies settled with the Department of Justice for $311
million in fines, including Zimmer® ($170M), DePuy® ($85M),
Biomet® ($27M), and Smith & Nephew® ($29M).26
Off-label promotion is another sign of companies eminent
domain-like attitude toward patient health. In one case, four
implant company executives served jail time after promoting
unapproved off-label useseven against explicit FDA
instructionsthat allegedly resulted in at least five patient
deaths on the operating table.27 If the profits from off-label
promotion outweigh the fines, or outweigh the expense of
clinical trials, companies may be making a calculated business
decision at the expense of a few patients health (or deaths).28
22. See the discussion infra Part II.C.
23. See Janice Hopkins Tanne, U.S. Companies Are Fined for Payments to
Surgeons, 335 BRIT. MED. J. 1065 (2007); News Release, Christopher J.
Christie, U.S. Atty, Dist. of N.J., Five Companies in Hip and Knee
Replacement Industry Avoid Prosecution by Agreeing to Compliance Rules
and Monitoring (Sept. 27, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files
/usao-nj/legacy/2013/11/29/hips0927.rel.pdf.
24. See News Release, Christie, supra note 23.
25. See id.; cf. ORTHOKNOW, supra note 3, at fig.2 (showing Depuy/JNJ
having 23% of the market share, Biomet with 11%, Zimmer with 24%, Smith
& Nephew with 12%, and Stryker with 18%).
26. See Tanne, supra note 23.
27. Kimes, supra note 17 (The Food and Drug Administration explicitly
told [the medical device company] not to promote [the product] for certain
spine surgeries, but the company pushed forward anyway.).
28. Id. (Off-label marketing is so common among drug and device makers
that its often dismissed as the equivalent of driving slightly over the speed
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In the aforementioned case, a clinical trial would reportedly
have cost about $1 million for the off-label use, so the company
instead devised a plan to get a few sites to perform 6080
procedures and help them publish their clinical results.29 The
company reportedly hoped that having a few doctors [perform]
the procedure[s] on their own without clinical trials would
popularize the product, but instead it allegedly cost at least
five patient lives.30 One executive for the company noted that
off-label marketing is the status quo and it happens every
day.31 The companys brochure even included a case study as a
textbook example from a woman who, unbeknownst to the
brochure-recipient surgeons, had died after the procedure.32 It
took five years before federal prosecutors moved to indict the
four company executives, who pled to lesser charges of
misdemeanor Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine
violations expecting only fines or probation.33 The grand jury
instead indicted the company and its executives handing out
fifty-two felony counts and forty-four misdemeanors.34 The
United States Attorneys office called it human
experimentation.35
Ultimately, the company paid $23 million in fines.36 But
the company was sold for $20 billion later in 2012.37 Twenty-
three million dollars is only around 0.1% of $20 billion; do
company executives simply see this as the cost of doing
businessi.e., part of their eminent domain? The four
executives got prison sentenceswith the judge sentencing
some above the federal sentencing guidelines because he
considered their crimes egregiouswith the longest sentence
being only nine months . . . even though five patients died.38
limit. During the past decade, pharmaceutical behemoths . . . have paid
billions in fines to settle charges that they engaged in off-label drug
promotion. Yet cases continue to happen, in part because the potential profits
often exceed the fines.).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Kimes, supra note 17.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Kimes, supra note 17.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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Recently, an off-label bone cement case involving another
company settled for $8.5 million.39
Thus, orthopaedic medicine is vulnerable to manipulation
by wealthy, ubiquitous device manufacturers that control the
tools of the trade.40
B. DETRIMENTAL STRIKING SHIFTS TO NEW IMPLANTS
Striking unexplainable shifts in implant use to devices
that lead to worse patient outcomes may also signal industry
control of orthopaedic medicine. The Research Committee
(Committee) of the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery
(ABOS)the certifying board for U.S. orthopaedic surgeons
published an article in 2008 noting a striking shift in hip
fracture treatment, which lends credibility to Sarmientos
assertion that the implant industry controls surgeon behavior
because the new device was ultimately found to come at a
higher cost with more complications.41
During the latter half of the twentieth century, the sliding
compression hip screw and side plate (The Plate; Figure 1)
became the implant of choice for the most common type of hip
fracture in older patientsthe intertrochanteric (IT) fracture of
the hip.42 From 1999 to 2006, young surgeons rapidly switched
to a new short intramedullary nail (The Nail; Figure 2) to
39. See Chad Terhune, University of California OKs $8.5 Million Payout
in Spine Surgery Cases, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 1, 2016), http://khn.org
/news/university-of-california-oks-8-5-million-payout-in-spine-surgery-cases.
40. Roy M. Poses, Neurosurgeon Admits Kickbacks from Medical Device
Manufacturers, HEALTH CARE RENEWAL (Jan. 4, 2008), http://hcrenewal
.blogspot.com/2008/01/neurosurgeon-admits-kickbacks-from.html (noting the
pervasiveness of conflicts of interest in health care and suggesting that
more of these conflicts may cross the line to criminality than [ ] heretofore
believed).
41. Jeffrey O. Anglen & James N. Weinstein, Nail or Plate Fixation of
Intertrochanteric Hip Fractures: Changing Pattern of Practice: A Review of the
American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery Database, 90 J. BONE JOINT &
SURGERY AM. 700, 705 (2008) (Our data, which were collected from young
orthopaedic surgeons in the beginning of their careers, confirm a higher rate
of fracture and procedure-related complications and, at best, equivalent pain
and deformity scores at the time of follow-up for patients managed with
intramedullary nail fixation.).
42. Id.
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treat this type of hip fracture, in spite of higher costs and worse
outcomes for the patients with the Nails.43
Figure 1: The Nail44 Figure 2: The Plate45
Specifically, the Committee found that in 1999, young
surgeons chose the Plate in 97% of IT hip fractures versus only
3% for the Nail.46 But just seven years later in 2006, a striking
shift had occurred such that the preference had flipped with
new young surgeons choosing the Plate only 33% percent of the
time, while choosing the Nail an incredible 67% percent of the
timerepresenting a 2,133% increase in market share for the
Nail in those seven years.47 The rate of the shift was striking
because young surgeons in 1999 only used the Nail 3% of the
time, while use doubled to 6% the following year in 2000, more
than doubled again the next year to 14% in 2001, almost
doubled again to 27% over the next two years in 2003, and
almost doubled again in the following two years to 53% by
2005, before reaching 67% in 2006 at the time the study was
published.48
43. Id. ([I]mplant costs alone are estimated to be two to four times higher
for intramedullary nail fixation.).
44. Reproduced with permission from OrthoInfo. © American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons. http://orthoinfo.aaos.org. See Hip Fractures, AM. ACAD.
OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS (last updated Apr. 2009), http://orthoinfo.aaos.org
/topic.cfm?topic=A00392.
45. Reproduced with permission from OrthoInfo. © American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons. http://orthoinfo.aaos.org. See Hip Fractures, AM. ACAD.
OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS (last updated Apr. 2009), http://orthoinfo.aaos.org
/topic.cfm?topic=A00392.
46. Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 41, at 701.
47. Id.
48. Id. at tbl.2.
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Why the shift? According to the Committee, the shift to the
Nail does not appear to be based on scientific evidence of
improved outcomes for patients.49 The theoretical selling points
of the Nail were the prospect of smaller incisions (minimally
invasive), stronger fixation, shorter operating times, and less
blood loss.50 However, instead of benefits, the Committee found
that there were significant (p < 0.05) increases in the rates of
bone fracture, unspecified surgical complications, and
procedure-related complications for patients managed with [a
Nail] as compared with those managed with a [Plate].51 Citing
multiple studies that included thousands of patients in total,
the Committee noted the only consistent differences found
between the two fixation techniques seem to be an increased
rate of complications (particularly intraoperative and
postoperative fractures) and a higher rate of reoperation in
association with [the Nail] and noting that the consensus
from the orthopaedic literature is that [Nail] fixation is
associated with a higher complication rate and no better
outcomes.52 The Committee acknowledged that it is possible
that some patients have had adverse effects because of this
change in practice,53 which is likely an understatement. The
Committee concluded by noting that the shift to the Nail
resulted in higher implant costs and surgeon fees, with no
improvement in patient outcomes.54 Thus, the striking shift
to the new device was clearly not based on scientific evidence or
improved patient outcomes.
Was doctor greed a factor? Higher surgeon fees were noted
by the Committee.55 Therefore, financial incentives in the
market place for the surgeon might play a role. For several
reasons, surgeon enrichment seems like only a minor factor.
First, the surgeons fees were only minimally higherabout
$235 per procedure56 for a procedure that a typical surgeon in
49. Id. at 706 (noting higher implant costs and surgeon fees, with no
improvement in patient outcomes).
50. Id. at 705.
51. Id. at 70405.
52. Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 41, at 705 (emphasis added).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 41, at 706.
56. Id. (calculating that the difference between the two procedures
results in a pay differential of approximately $235 in favor of intramedullary
nail fixation).
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my experience might perform twenty-five to fifty times per
year, thus totaling perhaps a $5,875 to $11,750 raise per year
for surgeons already making over $300,000 per year.57 While
not insignificant, it seems unlikely that two-thirds of young
orthopaedic surgeons would abandon their moral compass to
adopt a device with more complications jeopardizing patients
health for a 2% to 4% raise. It seems more likely that they are
simply using the devices upon which they were trained
matching Sarmientos observation that students simply use the
educational system to learn to use industrys tools.58 In trying
to explain the phenomenon, the Committee notes that, [i]t
may be that younger surgeons are responding to a change in
training and that for some reason residents are currently being
trained preferentially in [the Nail].59 Second, these are young
orthopaedic surgeons who are more likely to continue the
methods in which they were trained than abandon them for
financial gain immediately upon entering the marketplace,
starting a new practice, and trying to establish a name for
themselves.60 Third, the fact that payers are actually paying
higher surgeon fees for worse outcomes with a more expensive
device indicates forces other than young surgeons negotiation
skill must be at play, since young surgeons have little leverage
in demanding higher fees as they start their careers.61 Other
explanations seem more likely.
The implant companies had the biggest financial incentive
to encourage the striking shift to the Nail. By converting
orthopaedic surgeons to the Nail, the device maker could
double to quadruple revenues because the price for the Nail
was two to four times higher than that of the Plate.62 As
Sarmiento observed, device manufacturers likely control the
education process for orthopaedic surgeons who then simply do
what they have been taught upon entering the market place; in
many ways, orthopaedic surgery residency may be a sort of
57. Cf. MED. GROUP MGMT. ASSN, PHYSICIAN COMPENSATION AND
PRODUCTION SURVEY: 2008 REPORT BASED ON 2007 DATA 19 (2009) (reporting
median compensation for orthopaedic surgeons as $459,992 in 2008).
58. SARMIENTO, supra note 11, at 284.
59. Anglen & Weinstein, supra note 41, at 706.
60. See generally id.
61. Cf. id. at 706 (noting that certain external forces may encourage
young surgeons to seek out new techniques in a medical market that is
constantly searching for the latest in technology).
62. Id. at 705.
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microcosm of the Truman Show movie, in which young
surgeons accept the reality . . . presented by their teachers
under the directorship of the device manufacturers hidden
behind the scenes.63 In 2015, companies gave $6.5 billion to
doctors and teaching hospitals influencing research and patient
care at academic medical centers.64
Today, the Nail is still in use by many surgeons. Todays
Nail has been refined, so perhaps it is better; at this point, it is
impossible to say. But I foresee a day coming when the Plate
will be rolled back out as a new inventionat a higher
priceand surgeons will undoubtedly strikingly shift back
hopefully this time with better outcomes for patients.
C. LACK OF REGULATORY CHANGE IN SPITE OF VOCIFEROUS
CONCERNS
Another sign that Sarmiento may be correct about
orthopaedic medicine being the marketing arm for the implant
industry is the lack of any significant recent change in the FDA
approval process for orthopaedic medical devices. The FDA
clears implantable medical devices by two main pathways: (1)
Premarket Approval (PMA) review requiring clinical trials, and
(2) Premarket Notification (a.k.a., 510(k)) generally fast-
tracking clearance by exempting devices from clinical studies
confirming safety or efficacy if they can claim substantial
equivalence to existing devices termed the predicate
devices.65 In 2012, 88% of orthopaedic devices were cleared by
the shortcut 510(k) process versus only 53% for non-
orthopaedic medical devices.66 Orthopaedic devices cleared by
the 510(k) substantial equivalence shortcut are 11.5 times
more likely to be recalled than devices cleared by the PMA
63. THE TRUMAN SHOW (Paramount Pictures 1998).
64. Terhune, supra note 39 (commenting on federal data).
65. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 479 (1996) (noting that the
510(k) notification process is not comparable to the PMA process because the
510(k) review is completed in an average of only twenty hours whereas 1200
hours is necessary to complete a PMA review); see also Charles S. Day et al.,
Analysis of FDA-Approved Orthopaedic Devices and Their Recalls, 98A J.
BONE & JOINT SURGERY AM. 517, 518 (2016); Kyle M. Fargen et al., The FDA
Approval Process for Medical Devices: An Inherently Flawed System or a
Valuable Pathway for Innovation?, 5 J. NEUROINTERVENTIONAL SURGERY 269
(2013).
66. Day et al., supra note 65, at 517.
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process.67 Thus, orthopaedic patients are a particularly
vulnerable population.
In 2010, there was public outcry over several specific
devices and the 510(k) process.68 In 2011, the FDA asked the
Institute of Medicine (IOM) to review the 510(k) clearance
process and make recommendations to protect the health of the
public while protecting the legitimate interests of the
industry.69 After extensive study, the IOM concluded that the
510(k) process was fatally flawed70 because it generally does
not evaluate safety and efficacy and cannot be transformed into
such process.71 In its 298-page report, the IOM noted that the
substantial equivalence clearance process lacks the statutory
basis to be a reliable premarket screen for safety and
effectiveness of moderate risk devices and recommended that
Congress replace the system.72 The IOM recommended that the
67. Id.
68. See generally Dangerous Medical Devices: Most Medical Devices Have
Never Been Tested for Safety, CONSUMER REPS., May 2012, at 24,
http://consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/04/cr-investigates-dangerous-
medical-devices/index.htm; Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Vows to Revoke Approval
of Device, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15
/health/policy/15fda.html (noting that politics trumped science in the approval
of a knee patch); Gardiner Harris, U.S. Inaction Lets Look-Alike Tubes Kill
Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/21
/health/policy/21tubes.html (noting resistance from the medical device
industry and an approval process that discourages safety-related changes as
factors in deaths related to some tubing connections); Barry Meier, The
Implants Loophole, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com /2010
/12/17/business/17hip.html (recognizing potential problems with several
devices that had been cleared through the 510(k) process, including an
artificial hip); Alicia Mundy & Jared A. Favole, FDA Rips Approval of Medical
Device, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB125382260933538517 (noting that Congressional pressure damaged the
integrity of the FDAs approval process).
69. INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLICS HEALTH: THE
FDAS 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS, xi (2011) [hereinafter IOM
REPORT], http://www.nap.edu/catalog/13150/medical-devices-and-the-publics-
health-the-fda-510k-clearance.
70. INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLICS HEALTH: THE
FDAS 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS, 3 (2011) (report brief)
[hereinafter REPORT BRIEF IOM], http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd
/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Medical-Devices-and-the-Publics-Health-
The-FDA-510k-Clearance-Process-at-35-Years/510k%20Clearance%20Process
%202011%20Report%20Brief.pdf.
71. IOM REPORT, supra note 69, at 56.
72. REPORT BRIEF IOM, supra note 70, at 3; IOM REPORT, supra note 69,
at 198.
220 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 18:1
current system be replaced with an integrated premarket and
postmarket regulatory framework that effectively provides a
reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness throughout
the device life cycle.73 Calls for change to the FDAs approval
process for implantable medical devices have been vociferous
and have come from other highly respected authorities as
well.74
Predicate creepthe progression in which each
generation of new devices evolves farther and farther from any
device that has been proven safe and effectivemakes the
510(k) process even more dangerous since the cumulative
design changes may eventually lead to an implant with little
resemblance to any device that has been found safe and
effective.75 Once the FDA clears a device via 510(k) or PMA, it
can be used as a predicate for future devices without new
safety or efficacy proof.76 Thus, there may be a chain of devices
(predicate chain) upon which a new devices clearance rests,
none of which have ever been proven safe or effective,77 and the
devices foundation will be no stronger than the weakest link in
its predicate chain.
The implant industry argues that more regulation will
stifle innovation, yet the IOM found no evidence that the 510(k)
process facilitates innovation.78 Given Congress inaction
amidst the cacophony of voices, changes to the FDA regulations
73. IOM REPORT, supra note 69, at 196.
74. IOM REPORT, supra note 69, at 15, 16 (noting there is concern that the
510(k) process is neither fostering innovation nor making safe/effective devices
available to patients); see also, e.g., Letter from Representatives Henry A.
Waxman, Bart Stupak, & Frank Pallone, Jr., Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
to Joshua M. Sharfstein, Principal Deputy Commr, FDA (May 11, 2009);
Letter from Carmella Bocchino, Am.s Health Ins. Plans, to Jeffrey Shuren,
Div. of Dockets Mgmt., FDA (Mar. 19, 2010) (Document FDA-2010-N-0054-
0047).
75. Arianne Freeman, Predicate Creep: The Danger of Multiple Predicate
Devices, 23 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 127, 12729 (2014).
76. Sofia Bruera, The 510(k) Fast Track and Medical Device Discovery,
TRIAL, Sept. 2013, at 35, 36; Fargen et al., supra note 65, at 272, 275 n.27.
77. Bruera, supra note 76.
78. IOM REPORT, supra note 69, at 4. See generally Daniel B. Kramer et
al., Regulation of Medical Devices in the United States and European Union,
366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 848 (2012) (comparing U.S. and European regulatory
environments for medical devices).
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seem very unlikely.79 The pharmaceutical and health
manufacturing industry spent more than any other industry
($240 million) on lobbying in 2015.80 Instead of listening to the
IOM, in March 2016, Congress proposed regulations to make it
even easier to get orthopaedic devices to market.81
III. DIFFERENTIATING THE CUTTING EDGE OF
SCIENCE FROM THE MARKETING EDGE OF BUSINESS: A
LOOK AT SOME RECENT TOTAL JOINT REPLACEMENT
DESIGN DEFECT CLAIMS
Joint replacement surgery has been around for over fifty
years with little, if any, evidence that modern designs are
actually an improvement on designs that were available over
thirty years ago.82 By the 1970s and 80s, hip and knee
replacement surgeries offered vast improvements in pain and
function outcomes compared to their predecessor operations
like fusion of the joint, resection of the joint, and osteotomy
with joint realignment.83 An early total hip design using the
standard metal ball and a polyethylene socket from the
1970sthe Charnley hipwas later found to produce eighteen-
79. CONSUMER REPS., supra note 68, at 24 (identifying some of the
critics).
80. Top Organizations, OPEN SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby
/top.php?showYear=2015&indexType=i (last visited Oct. 5, 2016); see also
Harris, F.D.A. Vows to Revoke Approval of Device, supra note 68 (noting
politics trumped science in approval of knee patch); Harris, U.S. Inaction Lets
Look-Alike Tubes Kill Patients, supra note 68 (noting resistance from the
medical device industry and an approval process that discourages safety-
related changes as factors in deaths related to some tubing connections);
Mundy & Favole, supra note 68 (noting Congressional pressure damaged the
integrity of the FDAs approval process).
81. See Laura Laurenzetti, Senate Passes Bill to Speed Medical Device
Approvals, FORTUNE.COM, (Mar. 10, 2016, 11:47 AM), http://fortune.com/2016
/03/10/senate-medical-device-bill/.
82. See, e.g., Vivek Mohan et al., Monoblock All-Polyethylene Tibial
Components Have a Lower Risk of Early Revision than Metal-Backed Modular
Components, 84 ACTA ORTHOPAEDICA 530 (2013) (reporting results of a
[r]egistry study of 27,657 primary total knee arthroplasties). See generally
IOM REPORT, supra note 69; SARMIENTO, supra note 11.
83. MERCER RANG, THE STORY OF ORTHOPAEDICS 3554, 50910 (2000)
(tracing the history of hip arthroplasty, including the story of John Charnley,
and the history of knee arthroplasty).
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year success rates of 95%,84 twenty-five-year success rates of
85%,85 and thirty-five-year success rates of 78%.86
Likewise, total knee replacements from the 1980s proved
to be well designed. One of the early leaders in the field of total
knee replacement, Zimmer, produced a total knee replacement
that produced over 90% good-to-excellent outcomes, even in
relatively young patients, (under age fifty-five at the time of
their surgery) that were studied up to eighteen years after
their surgery.87
Joint replacement surgery brought expensive new medical
devices to orthopaedic surgery, creating a lucrative industry
that today accounts for over one-third of global orthopaedic
revenues; almost three million total joints were performed
worldwide in 2011 producing $13.4 billion in revenues in a
highly competitive market that is 95% controlled by [the] top
eight players with very little share shift over the decades.88
Ignoring the ancient maxim, the enemy of good is
better,89 hundreds of modifications of existing successful
designs were tried and various theoretical benefits marketed.90
By the late 1990s, at least thirty-seven different total knee
84. See, e.g., Neumann et al., supra note 2, at 249 (noting a survival rate
of 92 out of 103 hips).
85. Jaques Caton et al., Over 25 Years Survival After Charnleys Total
Hip Arthroplasty, 35 INTL ORTHOPAEDICS 185, 185 (2011).
86. John J. Callaghan et al., Survivorship of a Charnley Total Hip
Arthroplasty. A Concise Follow-Up, at a Minimum of Thirty-Five Years, of
Previous Reports, 91 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY AM. 2617, 2619 (2009).
87. See, e.g., JOHN INSALL ET AL., SURGERY OF THE KNEE 1658 (3d ed.
2001); Wayne A. Colizza, John N. Insall & Giles R. Scuderi, The Posterior
Stabilized Total Knee Prosthesis: Assessment of Polyethylene Damage and
Osteolysis After a Ten-Year Minimum Follow-Up, 77 J. BONE & JOINT
SURGERY AM. 1713, 1718 (1995) (reporting 96% good or excellent results at
eleven years follow-up); Diduch & Insall et al., supra note 2, at 576, 579;
Steven H. Stern & John N. Insall, Posterior Stabilized Prosthesis: Results
After Follow-Up of Nine to Twelve Years, 74A J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY AM.
980 (1992).
88. ORTHOKNOW, supra note 3, at 1, 2, 4.
89. See RATCLIFFE, supra note 5.
90. See 510(k) Premarket Notification, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://
www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm (showing 223
results when searching total knee in Device Name; showing 240 results
when searching total hip in Device Name) (last updated Nov. 8, 2016); cf.
R. Y. L. Liow & D. W. Murray, Which Primary Total Knee Replacement: A
Review of Currently Available TKR in the United Kingdom, 79 ANN. ROYAL C.
SURGERY ENG. 335 (1997) (analyzing TKR data from the United Kingdom).
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replacement models were being marketed by fourteen different
companies with one researcher noting that total knee models
were changing so rapidly that published data was difficult to
interpret owing to the frequent modification of the
prostheses.91 Many of the design changes are minor or produce
no obvious detrimental changes when studied years later.92
However, some seemingly innocuous design changes may
convert a previously almost guaranteed (> 90% chance) good
outcome to a bad outcome.93
Dr. Sarmientos description of the development process for
some cutting edge devices might explain cases where bad
outcomes are foreseeablewhere marketing overtakes science.
Sarmiento described an offer from a major medical device
manufacturer to market the Sarmiento Hip Prosthesis.94 The
company vice president flew to Sarmientos office and
presented him with a brand new, shining hip prosthesis in a
velvet-lined box and offered Sarmiento the opportunity to
endorse it as his own, accept a $250,000 check plus ongoing
royalties, lend his name to the device, and hawk it as his own
design.95 The problem was that Sarmiento had never seen the
device before that day; the company viewed Sarmientos input
in the design process as unnecessaryin spite of his clinical
experience and reputation as a world class hip surgeon.96
Sarmiento admirably turned down the offer, but the company
easily found a different professor within three months to
become their salesman.97
Later, when Sarmiento reminded an implant company
president that Charnleys total hip from the 1970s produced a
higher rate of successful outcomes than any contemporary hip,
the company president made it clear that he considered that
information totally irrelevant data.98 Instead, the implant
91. Liow & Murray, supra note 90, at 338, 340.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 339 (It should be remembered that any modification can cause
problems and do [sic] not automatically produce better results.).
94. SARMIENTO, supra note 11, at 287.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (When I asked the distributor who had developed the prosthesis,
he gave me the name of a senior professor at a respected medical school in the
eastern United States.).
98. Id. at 286.
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company president was concerned only with identifying those
surgeons who were the most likely to be good salespeople for
his products.99 The company president explained that by the
time his company released a new prosthesis to the public, they
had already begun work on the next version.100 Scientific
analysis and feedback from patients and surgeons, thus, did
not appear to factor into the design process at all.
When the line between marketing and science is crossed by
implant designers and manufacturers converting the cutting
edge of science into the marketing edge of big business, the
court system needs to step up and hold the risk-takers
accountable to those who are injured. Judges appear to be
struggling with these complex cases in ways that prejudicially
favor big business to the detriment of patients.101 To help look
at the issue, two recent alleged design defect issuesthose
raised in the metal-on-metal (MoM) hip cases and the Zimmer
Flex knee casesare explored in some detail followed by an
analysis of the courts application of current design defect law
in those cases and others. Nothing in this manuscript should be
interpreted to allege that any device mentioned is defective in
design; instead, the focus is intended to be on the judicial
processit is up to a jury to determine design defect, if given
the chance.
A. TOTAL JOINT REPLACEMENT EXAMPLES IN THE LEGAL NEWS:
THEMETAL-ON-METAL TOTAL HIP AND THE ZIMMER FLEX TOTAL
KNEE
The metal-on-metal (MoM) total hip and the Zimmer Flex
(Flex) knee both prognosticated better outcomes than
traditional hip and knee replacements, but unfortunately both
have allegedly resulted in worse outcomes with numerous
lawsuits filed.102 The MoM hip touted the elimination of
99. Id. at 286.
100. Id. at 28586.
101. See Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey, Daubert and the Disappearing
Jury Trial, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 31718 (2007).
102. See, e.g., Kransky v. DePuy Orthopaedics Inc., No. BC456086 (L.A.
Cty. Super. Ct. Cal., Mar. 8, 2013); Smith v. DePuy Orthopaedics Inc., et al.,
No. CJ201105804 (Tulsa Cty. D. Ct. Okla., Feb. 4, 2015); Annotation, $2.5
Million Verdict in Suit Alleging Defective Hip Transplant, 35 VERDICTS,
SETTLEMENTS & TACTICS Art. 50 (2015). See generally CHARLES J. NAGY, JR.,
HIP PROSTHESES, AM. L. PRODS. LIAB. 3D § 91:65 (citing William Jordan,
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polyethylene debrisa potential source for late failure of the
traditional metal-on-polyethylene design (traditional total
hips)and lower dislocation rates as potential benefits,103 and
the Flex knees promoted more knee flexion including a knee
specially designed for womenwho account for two-thirds of
U.S. total knee patients.104
1. Metal-on-Metal Total Hips
Metal-on-metal total hips presented the potential better
outcome of no polyethylene debris (a mode of failure for
traditional metal-on-polyethylene hips) and decreased
likelihood of hip dislocations compared to the good traditional
total hipslike the Charnley hip mentioned above.105 After
early versions of MoM hips had high revision rates in the 1970-
80s,106 MoM hips reemerged in the late 1990s with over one
million MoM hips performed worldwide since 1996.107 One
MoM hip that has received a lot of legal attention recentlythe
ASR XL Acetabular System (DePuy, Johnson &
Annotation, Products Liability: Medical Devices, 33 VERDICTS, SETTLEMENTS
& TACTICS Art. 53 (2013)).
103. See S.J. MacDonald et al., Metal-on-Metal Versus Polyethylene in Hip
Arthroplasty: A Randomized Clinical Trial, 406 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS &
RELATED RES. 282 (2003) (testing the accuracy of claims of reduced
polyethylene debris and decreased likelihood of dislocation).
104. CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
2003 NATIONAL HOSPITAL DISCHARGE SURVEY ADVANCE DATA NO. 359, 16,
tbl.10 (July 8, 2005).
105. See MacDonald et al., supra note 103 (discussing decreased debris);
Thomas M. Smith et al., Metal-on-Metal Total Hip Arthroplasty with Large
Heads may Prevent Early Dislocation, 441 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS &
RELATED RES. 137, 13940 (2005) (discussing decreased dislocation).
106. Brent M. Ardaugh et al., The 510(k) Ancestry of a Metal-on-Metal Hip
Implant, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 97, 98 (2013); see also Bruera, supra note 76,
at 36.
107. See Michael Bolognesi & Cameron Ledford, Metal-on-Metal Total Hip
Arthroplasty: Patient Evaluation and Treatment, 23 J. AM. ACAD.
ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY 724, 72425 (2015); Kevin J. Bozic et al., The
Epidemiology of Bearing Surface Usage in Total Hip Arthroplasty in the
United States, 91 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY AM. 1614 (2009) (reporting a data
set, collected during fifteen months in 2005-06, of more than 100,000 hip
arthroscopy patients); see also AM. ACAD. OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS (AAOS),
INFORMATION STATEMENT: CURRENT CONCERNS WITH METAL-ON-METAL HIP
ARTHROPLASTY 1 (2012), http://www.aaos.org/uploadedFiles/PreProduction
/About/Opinion_Statements/advistmt/1035%20Current%20Concerns%20with
%20Metal-on-Metal%20Hip%20Arthroplasty.pdf [hereinafter AAOS
INFORMATION STATEMENT].
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Johnson®)was introduced in the U.S. market in December
2005 after being cleared through the 510(k) substantial
equivalence pathway, and over 100,000 units were implanted
before its voluntary recall in August 2010.108
Concern first emerged over MoM hips in 2008 when
international databases (termed joint registries) in Britain
and Australia reported revision rates two- to three-fold higher
among MoM hips than traditional total hips.109 The FDA
responded by noting that overseas databases may not
necessarily correlate with experiences in the United States.110
By 2009, around 300 complaints mostly involving early revision
surgery had already been filed with the FDA.111 Adverse
reaction to metal debris was found to be the cause of failure in
several studies.112 In addition, elevated levels of cobalt and
chromium (among the metal components of MoM devices) were
found in the MoM patients bloodstreams with associated
chromosomal aberrations,113 along with neurologic and cardiac
abnormalities.114 Finally, in 2011, the FDA announced concerns
108. Fargen et al., supra note 65; Barry Meier, With Warning, a Hip Device
is Withdrawn, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03
/10/business/10device.html; see also U.S. ASR Hip Settlement Program
Website, https://www.usasrhipsettlement.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2016).
109. See AUSTL. ORTHOPAEDIC ASSN NATL JOINT REPLACEMENT
REGISTRY, ANNUAL REPORT 2008 (2008); Bolognesi & Ledford, supra note 107,
at 724, 730 (citing NATL JOINT REGISTRY FOR ENG. AND WALES, SEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT (2008), http://www.njrcentre.org.uk/njrcentre/Portals/0
/Documents/England/Reports/5th%20Annual.pdf; see also AAOS INFORMATION
STATEMENT, supra note 107, at 1.
110. Recalls, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/ImplantsandProsthetics
/MetalonMetalHipImplants/ucm241770.htm#3 (last visited Sept. 7, 2016)
[archival: http://www.burgsimpson.com/wp-content//uploads//sites/9/2015//07/
/FDA_Metal-on-Metal-Hip-Implants.pdf].
111. Fargen et al., supra note 65, at 269 (quoting Meier, supra note 108).
112. See Bolognesi & Ledford, supra note 107, at 724; D.J. Langton et al.,
Early Failure of Metal-on-Metal Bearings in Hip Resurfacing and Large-
Diameter Total Hip Replacement: A Consequence of Excess Wear, 92 J. BONE &
JOINT SURGERY BRIT. 38, 38 (2010); H. Pandit et al., Pseudotumours
Associated with Metal-on-Metal Hip Resurfacings, 90 J. BONE & JOINT
SURGERY BRIT. 847, 847 (2008).
113. See E. Dunstan et al., Chromosomal Aberrations in the Peripheral
Blood of Patients with Metal-on-Metal Hip Bearings, 90 J. BONE & JOINT
SURGERY AM. 517, 52122 (2008).
114. See Stephen S. Tower, Arthroprosthetic Cobaltism: Neurological and
Cardiac Manifestations in Two Patients with Metal-on-Metal Arthroplasty: A
Case Report, 92 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY AM. 2847, 2850 (2010).
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about MoM hips and ordered five manufacturers to perform
postmarket surveillance of their implants.115 Three implant
companies voluntarily recalled some of their MoM hip
devices.116
The news kept getting worse for MoM hips when, in March
2013, British researchers reported that the failure rate of
metal-on-metal total hips was much greater than other
designs; the researchers stated that the devices had poor
implant survival compared to other options and should not be
implanted.117 Specifically, a British study of 400,000 total hip
implant patients found a 6.2% failure rate for MoM hips
compared to only 1.7% for traditional total hip devices.118
In March 2013, a California jury awarded over $8 million
to a plaintiff in an ASR MoM hip case.119 In November 2013,
DePuy settled an estimated 7200 lawsuits involving the ASR
hips for $2.5 billion, with over 94% of the plaintiffs accepting
the settlement while some remain active in the courts.120 In
February 2015, an Oklahoma jury awarded a plaintiff with
bilateral ASR hips $2.5 million after both implants allegedly
failed.121
115. See Effectiveness of Metal-on-Metal Hip Implants, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures
/ImplantsandProsthetics/MetalonMetalHipImplants/ucm331960.htm (last
updated Mar. 14, 2016); U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-815,
FDA ORDERED POSTMARKET STUDIES TO BETTER UNDERSTAND SAFETY
ISSUES, AND MANY STUDIES ARE ONGOING, http://www.gao.gov/assets/680
/672860.pdf (2015).
116. Bolognesi & Ledford, supra note 107, at 725.
117. See Alison J. Smith et al., Failure Rates of Stemmed Metal-on-Metal
Hip Replacements: Analysis of Data from the National Joint Registry of
England and Wales, 379 THE LANCET 1199, 1199 (2012), http://
www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(12)60353-5/abstract
(emphasis added).
118. Id. at 120102 (reporting failure rate metal-on-metal hips); Metal-on-
Metal Hip Joints Should Not Be Implanted, British Study Says, 19 WESTLAW
J. MED. DEVICES 1 (2012) (reporting failure rate for traditional total hip
devices).
119. NAGY, supra note 102 (analyzing Kransky v. DePuy Orthopaedics Inc.,
No BC456086 (L.A. Cty. Super. Ct. Cal., Mar. 8, 2013)).
120. E.g., Kransky v. DePuy Orthopaedics Inc., 29 NATL JURY VERDICT
REV. & ANALYSIS Art. 12 (2014); accord Johnson & Johnsons DePuy Wins
First Trial over Pinnacle Hips: Herlihy-Paoli v. DePuy Orthopaedics, 21
WESTLAW J. MED. DEVICES 2 (2014).
121. See NAGY, supra note 102.
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Since settling the ASR lawsuits, DePuy (now part of
Johnson & Johnson) has taken a different approach with one of
its other MoM hipsthe Pinnacle hip. There has been no
recall of the Pinnacle MoM hips, but the company reportedly
stopped selling the MoM Pinnacle device in 2013.122 Over
6600 lawsuits are pending involving the MoM Pinnacle hips.123
DePuy spokeswoman Mindy Tinsley said the company is
committed to a long-term and vigorous defense of the
litigation claiming the MoM device was appropriately
developed, thoroughly tested and responsibly marketed.124 In
the first bellwether trial over Pinnacle, a Texas jury found
DePuy not liable after the company blamed the surgeon for
improperly positioned implants in a case where the plaintiffs
blood cobalt level rose to eighty-five times the normal level.125
DePuy sought to eliminate at least six experts proffered by the
plaintiffs steering committee; the ultimate outcome of the
Daubert rulings on those experts in motions in limine are
pending and will be considered closer to trial.126
On March 17, 2016, DePuys strategy may have backfired
when a Texas jury awarded five Texans a total of $502 million
for injuries related to the Pinnacle MoM hips.127 The jury found
that the devices were defective, and that DePuy was guilty of
gross negligence and fraud.128 DePuy promised to appeal with
Ms. Tinsley again asserting the MoM devices are backed by a
strong record of safety and effectiveness.129 Some MoM hip
devices appear to remain available on the companys website.130
122. 21 WESTLAW J. MED. DEVICES, supra note 120, at *1.
123. Id. at *1.
124. Id. at *1 (internal quotations omitted).
125. Id. at *1.
126. See In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Pinnacle Hip Implant Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 3:11-MD-2244-K, 2014 WL 3557345, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 18,
2014).
127. See Lisa Schencker, Johnson and Johnson Must Pay $502 Million over
Hip Devices, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.
modernhealthcare.com/article/20160317/NEWS/160319898/johnson-johnson-
must-pay-502-million-over-hip-devices.
128. Id.
129. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
130. See DEPUY SYNTHES, Hip Reconstruction: Products, http://www
.depuysynthes.com/hcp/hip/products/qs/PINNACLE-Bantam-Acetabular-Cup
(last visited Sept. 5, 2016).
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In February 2016, the FDA issued a final order saying that
with regard to two specific types of MoM hips, there is
insufficient evidence and information to conclude that general
controls in combination with special controls would provide
reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of these
devices.131 The FDA then classified the devices as higher risk
(Class III) and demanded that PMA applications be filed with
the FDA by May 18, 2016 if the manufacturer wants to
continue marketing their MoM total hip replacement devices
and/or market new MoM total hip replacement devices.132 The
theoretical advantages of MoM hips hawked by device
manufacturers now appear questionable at best, with a recent
study suggesting that the results of MoM hips appear to be
inferior to traditional total hips.133
2. Zimmer Flex Total Knees
The Zimmer NexGen® Flex total knees (Flex)including
the Gender Solutions High-Flex Knee and other versions
tout the potential for better knee flexion to replace the good
flexion of prior models.134 Two-thirds of all total knees in the
United States are performed on women,135 and the Gender
Solutions Flex knee is marketed especially for females as the
first and only knee replacement shaped to fit a womans
anatomy.136 The marketing information says, [f]rom the cells
in their bodies to their taste in clothes, its no surprise that
women are different from men . . . . [R]esearch shows women
and men are different all the way down to their knees[,] and
131. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA Activities, http://www.fda.gov
/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/ImplantsandProsthetics
/MetalonMetalHipImplants/ucm241769.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
132. Id.
133. William M. Mihalko et al., How Have Alternative Bearings and
Modularity Affected Revision Rates in Total Hip Arthroplasty, 472 CLINICAL
ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 3747, 3755 (2014) (The systematic review
concerning alternative bearings revealed that small head MoM had similar
but large head MoM had inferior results compared with both standard and
highly crosslinked polyethylene mated with any hard material.).
134. The Flex knee is included here because allegations of design defect are
being raised in many lawsuits, mentioned infra, such that the device serves as
a current example of the medical device trial process under Daubert.
135. DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note 104.
136. See, e.g., Marketing Material for the Zimmer Gender Solutions High-
Flex Knee, BOTSFORD, http://www.botsford.org/medical_services/orthopedics
/pdf/ZimmerGenderSolutionsHighFlexKnee.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2016).
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claims that thickness in the front of traditional knee
replacements may make womens knees feel bulky.137 The
companys brochure shows a woman curled up on the couch
with knees comfortably flexed and says simply, Because
Women and Men are Different.138
Interestingly, the inventor of the Flex knees, Dr. John
Insall,139 did not invent the Flex knee for womennor really
for Americans at all. While flying home from Japan on April 28,
1995, Dr. Insall proposed changes to his earlier NexGen total
knee design to allow more knee flexion to accommodate the
cultur[al] needs of Japanese knee replacement patients.140 Dr.
Insall said, we are involved in developing a more natural high
flexion knee prosthesis to accommodate higher flexion
demands of Middle Eastern and Asian patients who need
significant knee flexion during prayer.141 If the inventor
envisioned the mass marketing of this device to Americans or
to American women, this author cannot find such reference at
this time.142
137. Zimmer, Knee Replacement Surgery for Women: Key Differences
Between Womens and Mens Knees, http://www.zimmer.com/patients-
caregivers/article/knee/knee-surgery-women.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2016).
138. Zimmer, Brochure for Zimmer Gender Solutions NexGen High Flex
Implants, http://www.zimmer.com/content/dam/zimmer-web/documents/en-US
/pdf/medical-professionals/knee/zimmer-gender-solutions-NexGen-high-flex-
implants-brochure.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2016).
139. Disclosure: The author implanted Zimmer NexGen Legacy PS total
knees throughout his career as an orthopaedic surgeon. The author completed
a fellowship in knee reconstruction and sports medicine under the tutelage of
Dr. Insall and his colleagues at the Insall-Scott-Kelly (ISK) Institute in New
York City in 199697 and has co-authored several papers with Dr. Insall. See,
e.g., Frankie M. Griffin, John N. Insall & Giles R. Scuderi, Accuracy of Soft
Tissue Balancing in Total Knee Arthroplasty, 15 J. ARTHROPLASTY 970 (2000);
Frankie M. Griffin, John N. Insall & Giles R. Scuderi, The Posterior Condylar
Angle in Osteoarthritic Knees, 13 J. ARTHROPLASTY 812 (1998); Frankie M.
Griffin et al., Total Knee Arthroplasty in Patients Who Were Obese with 10
Years Followup, 356 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS. & RELATED RES. 28 (1998);
Frankie M. Griffin et al., Anatomy of the Epicondyles of the Distal Femur, 15
J. ARTHROPLASTY 354 (2000). See generally Giles R. Scuderi, W. Norman Scott
& Gregory H. Tchejeyan, The Insall Legacy in Total Knee Arthroplasty, 392
CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 3, 314 (2001) (profiling Dr. Insall).
140. Scott v. Zimmer, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 657, 663 (D. Del. 2012); see also
Scuderi, Scott & Tchejeyan, supra note 139.
141. INSALL ET AL., supra note 87, at 1555.
142. During his one year of training with Dr. Insall in 199697, the author
also cannot recall Dr. Insall ever mentioning in a clinical setting any concern
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Asians are of smaller build than Americans and may thus
put less stress upon a knee in deep flexion than taller143 and
heavier144 Americans. Also, anatomic differences in the contact
areas of kneecaps of Westerners versus those in Eastern
cultures have been reported, which may have implications for
deep knee flexion.145 So it would not be surprising if Dr. Insall
never intended the Flex knee for Americans at all.
So was there really a need for Americans, and particularly
American women, to have the 155! of flexion promised by the
Flex knee and the associated design changes? The Flex knees
predecessorthe non-Flex Zimmer NexGen kneewas doing
well and demonstrated the lowest rate [of revision] for a
widely used total-knee device in one study.146 In traditional
Western medical books, normal knee flexion appears to be
considered up to 130!.147 The drawing in Figure 3 demonstrates
how knee flexion (bending) is measured:
that American women needed more knee flexion than provided by traditional
total knee designs.
143. The average height of 50 to 79 year old Japanese men/women is
168.6/155.9 cm compared to the average height of 50 to 79 year old American
men/women of 174.9/161.0 cm. See MINISTRY OF EDUC., CULTURE, SPORTS,
SCI. & TECH., RESULTS OF AGE PHYSIQUE MEASUREMENT,
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/toukei/001/022/2004/002.pdf (Japanese
government statistics); CHERYL D. FRYAR ET AL., U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., ANTHROPOMETRIC REFERENCE DATA FOR CHILDREN AND
ADULTS: UNITED STATES, 20072010, at 13 tbl.9, 15 tbl.11 (2010),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_11/sr11_252.pdf.
144. The average North American weight is 177.9 pounds compared to the
average Asian weight of 127.2 pounds. See FRYAR ET AL., supra note 143 at 8
tbl.4, 10 tbl.6; Sarah C. Walpole et al., The Weight of Nations: An Estimation
of Adult Human Biomass, 12 BMC PUB. HEALTH 439, tbl.3 (2012) (comparing
worldwide obesity statistics, by geographical region).
145. INSALL ET AL., supra note 87, at 16 (Because the odd facet only makes
contact with the femur in extreme flexion (such as in the act of squatting), this
facet is habitually a noncontact zone in humans in Western cultures, a fact
that is thought to have some pathological significance.); cf. Clarke et al.,
Anatomy, MUSCULOSKELETAL KEY fig.1-6, http://musculoskeletalkey.com
/anatomy-3/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2016) (Because the odd facet makes contact
with the femur only in extreme flexion (such as in the act of squatting), this
facet is habitually a noncontact zone in human in Western cultures, a fact that
is thought to have some pathological significance.).
146. Joe Carlson, Device Maker Faces Massive Liability Case over Knee
Replacement Systems, MOD. HEALTHCARE (May 4, 2013), http://www
.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130504/MAGAZINE/305049979.
147. E.g., BARBARA BATES, A GUIDE TO PHYSICAL EXAMINATION AND
HISTORY TAKING 469 (5th ed. 1991).
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A suitable goal for flexion after rehabilitation of a total
knee patient is around 110!, which allows patients to rise and
sit in a chair and to traverse stairs.148 An aggressive goal could
be 135!, which some patients might use in bathing.149 The Knee
Societya highly-respected group of the top knee surgeons in
the worldrates a knee with 125! of flexion as a perfect score
on its rating scale, which was a revision of an older scale (HSS
score) that required 144! for a perfect score.150
This author cannot find convincing scientific justification
for pursuing 155! of knee flexion in the fifty- to eighty-year-
old151 American patients who undergo the vast majority of total
knee replacements in the United States. The Zimmer brochure
for its Gender Solutions knees focuses more on the change of
the shape of the implant as a selling point to better fit the
female bony anatomy, but also notes that the Gender Solutions
knee safely accommodates high flexionup to 155 degrees
for patients with the ability and desire to do so.152 But, the
148. P.J. Rowe et al., Knee Joint Kinematics in Gait and Other Functional
Activities Measured Using Flexible Electrogoniometry: How Much Knee Motion
is Sufficient for Normal Daily Life?, 12 GAIT & POSTURE 143, 14347, 155
(2000).
149. Id.
150. INSALL ET AL., supra note 87, at 150811 (quoting John N. Insall et
al., Rationale of The Knee Society Clinical Rating System, 248 CLINICAL
ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 13 (1989)).
151. AAOS, Orthoinfo: Total Knee Replacement, http://orthoinfo.aaos.org
/topic.cfm?topic=a00389 (last visited Sept. 7, 2016).
152. Zimmer, supra note 138.
Figure 3
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inventors design modifications were reportedly primarily
meant to achieve higher flexion.153
Unfortunately, some have alleged that Zimmer Flex knees
have under-performed their non-Flex counterparts to the
detriment of patients. In early 2006, Dr. Richard Bergerone
of Zimmers highly-paid, master surgeonsnotified the
company that too many of his Flex knee patients were
experiencing an unusual amount of pain and radiographic
loosening.154 Zimmer told Berger that he was the only surgeon
having that problem and blamed it on his surgical technique.155
In 2007, Berger stopped using the Flex knees, even though he
was still a paid Zimmer consultant.156 In that same year,
authors unaffiliated with Berger reported a marked rate of
early loosening with a 21% revision rate within two years for
their NexGen Flex knees (and 38% revision rate at thirty-two
months).157
In 2009, Zimmer did not renew Dr. Bergers contract after
previously paying him over $8 million during the prior ten
years.158 In 2010, Berger presented the results of 108 Flex knee
patients to a national meeting of the American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons (AAOS) reporting an 8.3% revision rate
and a 36% radiographic short-term loosening rate.159 Berger
called the revision rate of that version of the Flex knee
horrific and recommended that Zimmer pull it off of the
market.160
153. Scuderi, Scott & Tchejeyan, supra note 139, at 6 fig.8 (Intrigued by
the desire to bring total knee arthroplasty to regions of the world, such as Asia
and the Middle East, where patients require higher degrees of flexion for their
social and religious activities, Insall designed the LPS-Flex Knee
Prosthesis . . . .); INSALL ET AL., supra 87, at 1555.
154. See Barry Meier, Surgeon vs. Knee Maker: Whos Rejecting Whom?,
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/business
/20knee.html.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. H.S. Han et al., High Incidence of Loosening of the Femoral
Component in Legacy Posterior Stabilised-Flex Total Knee Replacement, 89B J.
BONE & JOINT SURGERY BRIT. 1457, 1457 (2007).
158. Meier, supra note 154.
159. Id.; Zimmer, Statement on the Zimmer NexGen CR-Flex Porous
Femoral Component (Form 8-K) EX-99.1 (Mar. 12, 2010), https://www.sec.gov
/Archives/edgar/data/1136869/000095012310023796/c56948exv99w1.htm.
160. Surgeons Challenge Zimmer to Pull High Flex NexGen Knees Off
Market Because of High Loosening Rates, ORTHOSTREAMS, http://
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Zimmer blamed the problem on Bergers surgical
technique, as Berger noted: Suddenly, I went from someone
who was their master teacher to someone who didnt know
what he was doing.161 After Bergers 2010 presentation to the
AAOS, Zimmer defended the device in its March 2010
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing citing
successful results in the Australian joint registry.162
Over 1500 lawsuits have been filed against Zimmer over
its NexGen Flex knees.163 In November 2015, Zimmer won the
first MDL bellwether trial.164 The presiding trial judge faced
complex Daubert challenges regarding the reliability of
testimony by multiple, highly qualified, scientific experts; she
excluded some expert testimony while allowing others
sometimes paradoxically.165 The trial judges educational
background included a history and humanities undergraduate
major, law school, and a prestigious judicial clerkship.166 Her
work background includes employment discrimination law,
commercial litigation, administrative law judicial duties, and
work as a United States Magistrate Judge.167 In spite of the
absence of any significant scientific background, the judge
wrote nearly two hundred pages analyzing complex motions for
exclusion of expert testimony regarding detailed intricacies of
total knee arthroplasty.168
The judge excluded the following Plaintiffs experts
testimony: (1) defective design testimony and causation
orthostreams.com/2010/03/surgeons-challenge-zimmer-to-pull-high-flex-
nexgen-knees-off-market-because-of-high-loosen-rates/ (last visited Sept. 7,
2016).
161. Meier, supra note 154.
162. Id.; Zimmer, supra note 159.
163. In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-C-
5468, 2015 WL 5145546, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2015); Jessica Dye, Zimmer
Wins First U.S. Trial Over NexGen Flex Knee Devices, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2015,
5:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/zimmer-biomet-NexGen-idUS
L1N1312VM20151106.
164. Dye, supra note 163.
165. For an example of several of the trial judges Daubert rulings, see In re
Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-C-5468, 2015 WL
5145546, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2015).
166. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Pallmeyer, Rebecca R., FED.
JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2802 (last visited Oct. 12,
2016).
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., infra notes 16979.
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testimony from an NYU professor of orthopaedics with
expertise in biomechanics, who performed over 100 total knee
replacements per year, gave over 200 lectures, and wrote
textbooks (Dr. Fetto),169 (2) defective design and causation
testimony from the plaintiffs treating doctor (Dr. Klein),170 and
(3) defective design testimony and 510(k) testimony from a
doctor of physiology and engineering who had previously
worked at the FDA (Dr. Samaras).171
The judge allowed for the plaintiff: (1) design defect
testimony from a retired professor (Dr. Brown),172 and (2)
testimony only regarding the plaintiffs treatment from her
surgeon (Dr. Klein).173
The judge excluded the following Defense experts
testimony: (1) x-ray alignment testimony regarding the
plaintiffs implant from a Stanford orthopaedic surgeon (Dr.
Goodman),174 (2) retrieval analysis testimony from failed Flex
knees by a Hospital for Special Surgery (HSS) research
scientist, Dr. Timothy Wright,175 and (3) 510(k) testimony from
an FDA expert (Ulatowski).176
On the Defense side, the judge allowed: (1) computer model
testimony on Finite Elemental Analysis of the forces on the
flexed knee by a research scientist from Scripps (Dr.
DLima),177 (2) epidemiology testimony from a pediatric spine
169. In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-C-
5468, 2015 WL 3669933, at *19 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 2015).
170. In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-C-
5468, 2015 WL 3799534, at *45 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 2015) (partially ignoring
Dr. Kleins testimony on FED. R. CIV. P. 26 grounds).
171. In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-C-
5468, 2015 WL 5145546, at *23 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2015).
172. In re Zimmer, 2015 WL 3669933, at *8.
173. In re Zimmer, 2015 WL 3799534, at *45 (allowing this portion of the
testimony as not subject to the Rule 26 requirements mentioned in note 170,
supra).
174. In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-C-
5468, 2015 WL 5095727, at *68 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2015).
175. Id. at *35.
176. In re Zimmer, 2015 WL 5145546, at *11.
177. In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-C-
5468, 2015 WL 4880953, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2015); Ronald V. Baker,
Witness Can Show Computer Model of Knee Implant in Zimmer NexGen MDL
Bellwether Trial, 22 WESTLAW J. MED. DEVICES 6, at *1 (Sept. 9, 2015); Darryl
DLima, In Vivo Knee Forces During Recreation and Exercise After Knee
Arthroplasty, 466 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 2605, 260511
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surgeon regarding his findings for the Zimmer total knee using
the Australian registry database and his review of the
literature (Dr. Vitale),178 (3) epidemiological testimony on his
review of the clinical literature by Dr. Timothy Wright at
HSS.179
At least one author attributed Zimmers success in the trial
to [e]xpert [t]akedown with Zimmer successfully curbing its
adversarys expert testimony under Daubert.180 One of the
attorneys noted, the loss of expert testimony . . . was clearly
very detrimental to the plaintiffs.181
Zimmer blamed the plaintiffs failed total knee on her
operating surgeon, claiming he hadnt properly secured the
implants in place.182 Three more bellwether cases will be
selected from pools of cases selected by Zimmer and the
plaintiffs.183 The next bellwether trial will be a case selected
by Zimmer.184
B. EXPERT TESTIMONYWILL DETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF
MOST COMPLEX ORTHOPAEDIC DESIGN DEFECT CASES AND
DAUBERT STANDS AS A POTENTIAL ARTIFICIAL AND
UNREASONABLE BARRIER UNLESS INTERPRETED FAIRLY
Design defect law is complex and varies depending upon
the jurisdiction; but regardless of the prevailing law, expert
testimony is likely to determine the outcome at almost any
orthopaedic device trial.185 The Supreme Court in Daubert
provided a framework for judicial analysis of the admissibility
of expert testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702
which has the potential to become an artificial and
(2008) (discussing the level of force involved in various activities for post-
operative patients).
178. In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-C-
5468, 2015 WL 5050214, at *4, *13 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2015).
179. In re Zimmer, 2015 WL 5095727, supra note 174, at *8.
180. Sindhu Sundar, Zimmers Expert Takedown Poses Hurdles for Knee
Patients, LAW360 (Nov. 12, 2015, 5:43 PM) http://www.law360.com/articles
/724921/zimmer-s-expert-takedown-poses-hurdles-for-knee-patients.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See John Hein, When Reliable is Reliable Enough: The Use of Expert
Testimony After Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 6 WASH. U. J. L. & POLY 223, 223
(2001).
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unreasonable barrier to recovery, for plaintiffs in orthopaedic
design defect cases, if interpreted prejudicially in favor of the
device industry.186
1. Expert Testimony Will Likely Be Determinative in Virtually
All Cases of Alleged Design Defect for Orthopaedic Implants
Proper handling of expert testimony is the key to obtaining
just outcomes in orthopaedic implant design cases. Less
complex general design defect problems have been described as
ill-suited for litigation due to (1) the complexity of the issues,
(2) the polycentricity of the analysis required, and (3) the
dearth of qualified judges and juries capable of dealing with the
expert testimony involved.187
There is no universal definition for design defect, and
different jurisdictions (and sometimes judges within the same
jurisdiction) interpret the same tests in different ways.188
Definitions of defect include: fail[s] to perform in a manner
reasonably . . . expected in light of [its] nature and intended
function or is unreasonably dangerous,189 fails to meet
reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its
safety,190 would be withheld from the market due to known
risks by a reasonable and humane seller,191 fails to fulfill a
policy assumption,192 fails to meet reasonable consumer
expectations,193 among other definitions.194 The Restatements
say that one engaged in the business of selling or distributing a
186. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) ([T]he
trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.).
187. James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers Conscious
Design Choice: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 153941
(1973) (discussing struggles of polycentricity in products liability). But see
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995)
(providing Circuit Judge Kozinskis analysis on remand).
188. Aaron D. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and
Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in
the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521, 54447 (1982) (addressing some of the
issues associated with defining design defect).
189. Defective and Unreasonably Dangerous Condition of Product, AM. L.
PRODS. LIAB. 3D § 17:5 (2016).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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defective product is liable for harm to persons caused by the
defect.195 Thus, a defect and causation are required under the
Restatements.196 The Restatements classify a product as
defective in design, when the foreseeable risks of harm posed
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission
of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe.197
No matter the definition, expert testimony will be required
to meet most any standard where risk-utility balancing
(including reasonableness), proximate causation (including
foreseeability), or reasonable alternative design comes into
play. To be defective, the risks of harm must be foreseeable
such that: [o]nce the plaintiff establishes that the product was
put to a reasonably foreseeable use, physical risks of injury are
generally known or reasonably knowable by experts in the
field.198 A degree of knowledge that includes the common
knowledge attributable to experts in the field is imputable to
medical device manufacturers.199
Many states require proof from the plaintiff that a device is
not reasonably safe by requiring the proposal of a safer
reasonable alternative design (or comparable term) that is
technologically feasible (and in some states, economically
feasible).200 An orthopaedic expert will be required to propose a
reasonable alternative design in almost any orthopaedic
implant design defect case.
195. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST.
1998) (emphasis added).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
198. Id. § 2 cmt. m (emphasis added).
199. Curtis, Collins & Holbrook Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 215, 222
(1923) (The general rule is that a principal is charged with the knowledge of
the agent acquired by the agent in the course of the principals business.);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 272 (AM. LAW INST. 1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (AM. LAW INST. 1998); A.G.S., Annotation,
Duty of Manufacturer or Seller to Warn of Latent Dangers Incident to Article
as a Class, as Distinguished from Duty with Respect to Defects in Particular
Article, 86 A.L.R. 947, Art. 2, Cumulative Supp. (1930) (explaining the
imputation, and identifying cases where the duty was breached).
200. See, e.g., Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg., 450 N.E.2d 204, 209 (N.Y.
1983) (accepting a plaintiffs showing of a safer design for a circular power
saw).
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When reasonableness enters the equation, courts often
turn to risk-utility balancing similar to negligence claims, even
in strict products liability cases, so familiar tests such as Judge
Learned Hands B < PL may come into play.201 Again, experts
are vital to assessing all of the factors in the famous equation
from Carroll Towing. Professor John Wade identified seven
factors used by many jurisdictions to perform risk-utility
evaluations: (1) usefulness and desirability of the productits
utility to the user and public as a whole, (2) safety aspects of
the product, including likelihood of resulting injury and
seriousness of any injury, (3) availability of a substitute
product to meet the same need and not be as unsafe, (4)
economic feasibility of eliminating the devices unsafe
character, (5) users ability to avoid the danger by the exercise
of care in the use of the product, (6) users anticipated
awareness of the dangers inherent in the product, and (7)
feasibility . . . of the manufacturer . . . spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability
insurance.202 Expert testimony will be important in meeting
all of Wades factors, but especially safety aspects (#2),
availability of a substitute product (#3), economic feasibility of
eliminating unsafe character (#4), and feasibility of loss
spreading (#7).203
201. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)
(establishing the B < PL equation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS.
LIAB. § 2.
202. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
MISS. L.J. 825, 83738 (1973). Wades factors have been adopted by many
jurisdictions. See, e.g., LaBelle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515
n.4 (D. S.C. 2001); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 87980 (Ariz. 1985)
(en banc); Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 184 n.10 (Colo. 1992);
Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1330 n.10 (Conn. 1997);
Tabieros v. Clark Equipment Co., 944 P.2d 1279, 1309 (Haw. 1997); Wortel v.
Somerset Indus., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 1211, 1218 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); Banks v.
Iron Hustler Corp., 475 A.2d 1243, 1252 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984);
Nunnally v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 869 So.2d 373, 37980 (Miss. 2004);
Duke v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 41112 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983); Johansen v. Makita U.S.A., Inc., 607 A.2d 637, 64243 (N.J. 1992);
Duran v. Gen. Motors Corp., 688 P.2d 779, 784 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Rainbow
v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 79 A.D.2d 287, 291 n.2, 436 N.Y.S.2d 480, 483 n.2
(N.Y. App. Div. 1981), affd, 434 N.E.2d 1345 (N.Y. 1982); Roach v. Kononen,
525 P.2d 125, 12829 (Or. 1974); Phatak v. United Chair Co., 756 A.2d 690,
694 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
203. See Wade, supra note 202, at 63840. The author elucidates how the
technical nature of design defect cases often require technical expertise to
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Thus, in order to prove design defect, experts are vital to
both sides in proving elements of their cases, in all
jurisdictions, and in almost every case. As noted by the
Restatements, [f]or justice to be achieved, the definition of
design defect should not be construed to create artificial and
unreasonable barriers to recovery.204 Prejudicial Daubert
rulings eliminating vital experts on either side have the
potential to create exactly such an unjust barrier.
2. Dauberts Framework as a Possible Artificial and
Unreasonable Barrier to Recovery
Since most orthopaedic device companies are located in
Warsaw, Indiana,205 complete diversity removal to federal court
is often an option, and seems to be the preference for
orthopaedic device manufacturers in states where Daubert has
not been adopted.206 Daubert was supposed to allow juries to
hear well-reasoned, novel scientific evidence replacing Fryes
test that allowed only evidence with general acceptance in [a]
particular field.207 The judges role is supposed to be that of a
gatekeeper to exclude unreliable expert testimony and keep
junk science out of the courtroom.208 The jury is charged with
assessing the weight and credibility of relevant evidence.209
Daubert outlined a flexible, non-exclusive checklist for trial
judges to use in the assessment of the admissibility of expert
evaluate dangerousness of a product. In order to properly evaluate whether
the defect could be overcome by reasonable means and cost, it stands to reason
an expert is necessary.
204. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (emphasis
added).
205. See Barnaby Feder, In the Land of the Orthopaedic Implant, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 18, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/18/business/in-the-
land-of-the-orthopaedic-implant.html.
206. See, e.g., Shelton v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. CV 1108082 DDP
(JCGx), No. CV 11-08082 DDP JCGX, 2011 WL 6001630, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
207. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
208. FED. R. EVID. 702, Committee Notes on Rules2000 Amendment,
http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title28a-
node216-article7-rule702&num=0&edition=prelim [hereinafter FRE 702
Committee Notes]; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,
1317 (9th Cir. 1995); Hein, supra note 185; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 153 (1997) (discussing Dauberts junk science target); Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 58995 (1993); 985 Assoc., Ltd. v.
Daewoo Elecs. Am., Inc., 945 A.2d 381, 384 (Vt. 2008).
209. FED. R. EVID. 104(e).
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testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702, including
(1) whether the experts technique or theory has been
objectively tested, (2) whether the experts technique or theory
has been subject to peer review and publication, (3) whether
there is a known rate of error of the experts technique or
theory, (4) whether there are standards and controls involved
in the experts technique or theory, and (5) whether the experts
technique or theory has been generally accepted in the
scientific community.210 The court did not intend for these
factors to be dispositive or conclusive.211 Other courts have
added additional factors to the analysis including (1) whether
the experts have developed their opinions expressly for
purposes of testifying,212 (2) whether there is too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered,213
(3) whether the expert has accounted for obvious alternative
explanations adequately,214 (4) whether the expert is being as
careful in his paid litigation consulting as he would be in his
regular professional work,215 and (5) whether the experts field
of expertise is known for reliable results in the area of the
experts testimony.216
Daubert is not supposed to empower trial court judges to
determine which scientific theory or conclusion is best; instead,
it demands that the judge focus on the principles and
methodology employed by the expertnot on the conclusions
they generate.217 Overall, the rejection of expert testimony is
210. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 58995; FRE 702 Committee Notes, supra note
208.
211. See FRE 702 Committee Notes, supra note 208 (Daubert itself
emphasized that the factors were neither exclusive nor dispositive.).
212. See Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317 (cautioning that courts may not ignore
the fact that a scientists normal workplace is the lab or the field, not the
courtroom or the lawyers office).
213. See Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 146.
214. See Claar v. Burlington N. R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1994)
(citing Daubert for the proposition that experts should not neglect[ ] to
investigate any other possible causes of plaintiffs injuries).
215. See Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir.
1997).
216. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999); Sterling
v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
217. FRE 702 Committee Notes, supra note 208; Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993). See also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. v.
Residential Funding Co., 989 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D. Mass. 2013); Amorgianos v.
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the exception rather than the rule.218 The trial judges role as
gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a replacement for the
adversary system.219 Again, it is the jury that is charged with
assessing the weight and credibility of the evidence.220
The Daubert Court emphasized that vigorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence.221 Contradictory opinions should both often be
deemed reliable.222 Proponents of experts only have to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the experts opinion is
reliable, NOT that it is correct.223 In some cases, experience
aloneor experience in combination with other knowledge, skill,
training, or education may be sufficient for the experts
opinion to be reliableRule 702 expressly contemplates that
an expert may be qualified on the basis of experience.224
Dauberts judicial charge has challenged federal judges
from the beginning. The Ninth Circuit, on Daubert remand,
considered their lot an uncomfortable position in a Brave
New World describing its new gatekeeper role as complex and
daunting where though [it was] largely untrained in science
and certainly no match for any of the witnesses whose
testimony [it was] reviewing, it [was the Courts] responsibility
to determine whether those experts proposed testimony
amount[ed] to scientific knowledge, constitut[ed] good
science, and was derived by the scientific method.225 The
court recognized that the cutting edge of science is where fact
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2002); Brumley v. Pfizer,
Inc., 200 F.R.D. 596 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
218. FRE 702 Committee Notes, supra note 208.
219. United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land Situated in Leflore Cty., 80 F.3d
1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
220. FED. R. EVID. 104(e).
221. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (1993) (emphasis added).
222. See, e.g., Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 160 (3d Cir. 1999).
223. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994)
(A judge will often think that an expert has good grounds to hold the opinion
that he or she does even though the judge thinks that the opinion is
incorrect).
224. FRE 702 Committee Notes, supra note 208 (emphasis added); see, e.g.,
United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997); Tassin v. Sears
Roebuck, 946 F. Supp. 1241, 1248 (M.D. La. 1996).
225. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 131516 (9th Cir.
1995).
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meets theory and certainty dissolves into probability and
seemed reluctant to take a deep breath and proceed with [the]
heady task at hand.226 Thus, it is understandable that federal
judges might struggle to handle complex orthopaedic implant
design cases properly.
Since Daubert, in limine challenges have increased,
primarily driven by a significant increase in the number of in
limine challenges raised against plaintiff expert witnesses.227
One-sided interpretations of Daubert by federal judges to the
detriment of plaintiffs can have a chilling effect on the
availability of fair jury trials in complex areas of litigation like
orthopaedic implant designespecially if the judges are
prejudicially allowing defense experts while simultaneously
prejudicially excluding plaintiff experts.228 It is therefore
particularly important that federal judges properly distinguish
between unreliable science, reliable science, and marketing
tactics in order to justly adjudicate orthopaedic design defect
cases.
C.DAUBERT RULINGS OFTEN DECISIVELY FAVOR THE
ORTHOPAEDIC INDUSTRY: A CLOSER LOOK AT ORTHOPAEDIC
DESIGN DEFECT CASES
Under Rule 702 and Daubert, the trial judges role is to
exclude unreliable expert testimony.229 Prejudicial tendencies
in pre-trial Daubert rulings on admissibility of expert
testimony likely determine the outcomes of complex
orthopaedic design defect litigation and may lead to an
artificial and unreasonable barrier to recovery for injured
patients.230 Judges tend to prejudicially allow defense experts
while simultaneously prejudicially excluding plaintiff experts
in orthopaedic design defect cases. This may be due to (1)
improperly interpreting the reliability of scientific testimony by
226. Id.
227. David M. Flores et al., Examining the Effects of the Daubert Trilogy on
Expert Evidence Practices in Federal Civil Court: An Empirical Analysis, 34 S.
ILL. U. L. J. 533, 562 (2010).
228. See Kanner & Casey, supra note 101, at 31718 (identifying a study
where the frequency of summary judgment grants against plaintiffs had
increased).
229. FRE 702 Committee Notes, supra note 208; see also Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 59293 (1993).
230. See, e.g., In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
11-C-5468, 2015 WL 4880953 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2015).
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admitting experts with million dollar conflicts of interest while
excluding experts paid thousands to formulate answers to novel
questions raised by new, untested implants, (2) judges relying
too heavily on flawed epidemiology testimony while discounting
experience testimony, and (3) judges giving prejudicial
deference to industry polycentricity theories while ignoring
industrys double standard on polycentricity in the underlying
substantial equivalence determinations.231
1. Improper Interpretation of Reliability: Allowing Conflict of
Interest Testimony While Disfavoring Trial Prep Testimony
Judicial gatekeepers tend to ignore unreliability issues
haunting defense experts with million dollar conflicts of
interest affecting their research, while they aggressively
disfavor plaintiff experts who performed their research in
preparation for trial for a few thousand dollars.232
a. Favoring Testimony from Defense Experts with Million
Dollar Conflicts
Conflicts of interest affect reliability of expert testimony
such that some experts with clear conflicts of interest should be
excluded under Daubert, but there appears to be a tendency for
these conflicts to be overlooked by the gatekeepers.233 Conflicts
of interestespecially royalties and consultant or employee
statushave been shown to lead to positive outcome bias
reporting in orthopaedic research.234 One study reported the
statistically significant finding that orthopaedic surgeons with
royalties, stock options, or consulting/employee contracts were
more likely to report positive outcomes in their studies than
231. See discussion infra Part III.C Sections 1, 2, and 3; see also Sumner v.
Biomet, 434 F. Appx 834 (11th Cir. 2011) (excluding experts with budgets
only in the thousands); In re Zimmer, 2015 WL 4880953 (discussing admission
of experts with million-dollar conflicts of interest).
232. See discussion infra Sections 1.a, 1.b; see also Sumner, 434 F. Appx at
834 (disfavoring low-budget research testimony); In re Zimmer, 2015 WL
4880953 (favoring million-dollar conflicts of interest).
233. See, e.g., In re Zimmer, 2015 WL 4880953.
234. Kanu Okike et al., Conflict of Interest in Orthopaedic Research: An
Association Between Findings and Funding in Scientific Presentations, 89 J.
BONE & JOINT SURGERY AM. 608, 60813 (2007).
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those without those conflicts of interest.235 Specifically, 100% of
the surgeons with stock options, 98.4% of those with royalties,
and 97.8% of those who were employees of implant companies
reported positive outcomes.236
Self-preservation, loyalty, and emotional connections with
pet projects can lead to unreliable testimony from experts with
conflicts of interestespecially large financial conflicts like
royalties, stock options, and employment contracts.237 Design
contracts and royalties are lucrative business for the
researcherswith some consulting surgeons making millions
so [f]ew researchers today will risk alienating the hands
that feed them.238 Testifying against the industry in a lawsuit
certainly carries a substantial risk of alienating the device
makers in a small, highly-profitable environment where eight
companies have consistently controlled 95% of the market.239 In
addition, industry experts may feel a particular loyalty to
protect the defendant company who has directly supported
them, their research, and their pet projects over the years240
with new devices becoming like their own newborn baby . . . in
which it is subjectively impossible for the parent to see an ugly
flaw.
The Zimmer Flex bellwether case outlined earlier is a good
example of apparently unnoticed significant conflicts of interest
that could affect the reliability of the experts testimony. In
that case, the judge did a well-reasoned (for a non-scientist,
non-orthopaedist jurist) analysis of the experts testimony
proffered by both sides.241 She allowed two experts for the
235. Id. at 609; see also Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review,
289 JAMA 454, 45465 (2003).
236. Okike et al., supra note 234, at 611.
237. Bekelman et al., supra note 235, at 463.
238. SARMIENTO, supra note 11, at 278.
239. See ORTHOKNOW, supra note 3, at 4.
240. Barry Meier, Doctors Who Dont Speak Out, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/sunday-review/the-hip-replacement
-case-shows-why-doctors-often-remain-silent.html.
241. See, e.g., In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
11-C-5468, 2015 WL 5095727 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2015); In re Zimmer NexGen
Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-C-5468, 2015 WL 4880953 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 13, 2015).
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defense with obvious conflicts of interest that received no
mention in her analysis of reliability.242
Specifically, over the plaintiffs objection, the judge allowed
Dr. Darryl DLima to testify and present a computer
simulation technique to model the real-world behavior of
physical structures.243 DLima collaborates with Zimmer on
total knee design244 and listed himself as a Principal
Investigator for Zimmer in his online public Conflict of
Interest Disclosure for the orthopaedic journal, Arthroplasty, in
October 2014.245 Not only was DLimaa collaborator,
Principal Investigator, and agent of the Defendantallowed to
offer opinion testimony, he was allowed to present a computer
simulation of knee kinematics during flexion without a single
mention of his conflicts of interest in the judicial analysis.246 If
DLima received royalties, stock options, or employment from
Zimmer, then the positive outcome bias reported in the
orthopaedic literature for such researchers should have been
given considerable weight in the Daubert calculus for
unreliable expert testimonyespecially considering his
testimony based on theoretical computer modelsunder Rule
702.247
A second expert with an obvious conflict of interest was
likewise allowed to testify in the Zimmer Flex case. Dr.
Timothy Wright disclosed himself as a Paid Consultant for
Zimmer as noted in his online public Conflict of Interest
Statement for the journal, Arthroplasty, in March 2015.248 The
judge apparently allowed Dr. Wright to give his analysis of the
orthopaedic literature to the jury as kind of epidemiology study
242. See In re Zimmer, 2015 WL 4880953.
243. Id. at *2; see also Baker, supra note 177, at *6.
244. See Darryl DLima et al., In Vivo Knee Forces During Recreation and
Exercise After Knee Arthroplasty, 466 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED
RES. 2605, 2606 (2008).
245. Darryl DLima, Conflict of Interest Statement, J. ARTHROPLASTY (Oct.
14, 2014), http://www.arthroplastyjournal.org/cms/attachment/2034778135
/2050119221/mmc1.pdf.
246. In re Zimmer, 2015 WL 4880953, at *2; see also Baker, supra note 177,
at *12.
247. FRE 702 Committee Notes, supra note 208.
248. Timothy Wright, Conflict of Interest Statement, J. ARTHROPLASTY
(Mar. 7, 2015), http://www.arthroplastyjournal.org/cms/attachment/20457472
96/2057042939/mmc1.pdf.
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relating to the Zimmer Flex knees.249 In her thirty-four page
Daubert analysis of Wright and some other experts, conflict of
interest was not mentioned in the reliability assessment.250
The orthopaedic peer-reviewed journal editors consider it
essential that an author disclose potential conflicts of interest,
and the court system should do likewise if it hopes to properly
determine reliability.251 Some paid consultants make millions
of dollars.252 The American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons
has a Mandatory Disclosure Policy for educational programs,
in place since 2011, requiring presenters to disclose relevant
potentially conflicting interests or commercial relationships.253
Likewise, the Journal of the American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons along with seventeen other peer-reviewed
orthopaedic journals issued a consensus statement saying
readers of medical journals are entitled to a full disclosure of
all financial conflicts of interest of the authors of those
articles254 and agreeing to use the universal disclosure form
developed by the International Committee of Medical Journal
Editors (ICMJE).255
249. In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-C-
5468, 2015 WL 5095727, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2015) (Dr. Wright reviews
six studies and data from the Australian Orthopaedic Associations National
Joint Registry, and opines that, if the design were defective, consistent failure
of the device would manifest in the clinical evidence.).
250. See id.
251. Vernon T. Tolo, Editorial, Orthopaedic Journals and Conflicts of
Interest, 93 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 2145 (2011) (emphasis added),
http://jbjs.org/content/jbjsam/93/23/2145.full.pdf.
252. See, e.g., Meier, supra note 154 (reporting compensation for Dr.
Richard Berger at more than $8 million over a decade); see also Tolo infra note
256, at 1 (mentioning thirty-two orthopaedic surgeons who were known to
have been paid over $1 million during the year prior to publication of their
article); DORR ARTHRITIS INST., Dr. Lawrence Dorr, http://www
.dorrarthritisinstitute.org/dorr.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2016) (noting Dr.
Dorr has been paid millions of dollars in royalties for his devices); Bruera,
supra note 76, at 38 (noting the surgeons mentioned received millions of
dollars in royalties).
253. AAOS Mandatory Disclosure Policy, AAOS, http://www.aaos.org
/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=5627 (last visited Sept. 20, 2016).
254. Tolo, supra note 251, at 2145.
255. See ICMJE, Conflicts of Interest, INTL COMM. MED. J. DIRS.,
http://www.icmje.org/conflicts-of-interest/ (scroll down until you see blue
download button; then click download to access form) (last visited Sept. 7,
2016).
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If readers of journals are entitled to a full disclosure,
shouldnt judges and juries be similarly entitled? Even with
disclosure policies in place in 2010, compliance was still an
issue; one study showed a 46% nondisclosure rate of conflicts
of interest among thirty-two orthopaedic surgeons . . . who were
known to have been paid over $1 million in the year before
publication of the article.256
Courts should require conflict of interest disclosure
statements similar to those used for orthopaedic journals from
all experts. Those conflicts should be taken into account by the
judicial gatekeeper when deciding whether the testimony is
reliable under Daubert, particularly considering the well-
documented positive outcome bias among conflicted
researchers.
b. Disfavoring Testimony from Plaintiffs Experts with
Thousand Dollar Conflicts
Paradoxically, the courts have flipped the conflict of
interest argument against plaintiffs experts. From the outset,
courts have concluded that experts making several thousand
dollars to prepare research in preparation for trial have an
unacceptable conflict of interest, while concluding that experts
making millions of dollars preparing research to support their
own products, royalties, stock options, and employee contracts
do not have an inadmissible conflict. Indeed the Ninth Circuit,
on Daubert remand, indicated that a factor especially
important to the analysis was whether the experts have
developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying
and whether the expert has conducted [his/her research]
independent of the litigation.257
The Court assumed that independent research carries its
own indicia of reliability, as it is conducted . . . in the usual
course of business and must normally satisfy . . . standards to
256. Vernon T. Tolo, Editorial, Interest in Conflicts, 93 J. BONE JOINT &
SURGERY AM. 1 (2011) (citing Susan Chimonas et al., From Disclosure to
Transparency: The Use of Company Payment Data, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 81 (2010)); see also Kanu Okike et al., Accuracy of Conflict of Interest
Disclosures Reported by Physicians, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1466, 146674
(2009).
257. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.
1995).
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attract funding and institutional support.258 However, in
orthopaedic design defect cases, novel issues are often
presented by new devices that have never been studied by
anyone (so there is no pre-existing research).259 This includes
the same defendants who are making millions from the sale of
the device, cleared the device via the substantial equivalence
pathway, and will often roll out a new device before there is
time to figure out any problems with the old device.260 Further,
research performed by paid consultants for the device
manufacturer is not independent, even if done before the
litigation begins.
The metal-on-metal (MoM) hip cases are an excellent
example of the novel questions posed by design defect questions
and the enormous dilemma plaintiffs experts face in attacking
an alleged defect for an orthopaedic implant. Metal debris
around the hip and elevated metal ion levels in the blood
stream were simply something that had not been previously
seen nor studied. In a MoM hip case filed in 2008 (before the
FDA got involved and before the recalls), the plaintiff hired a
metallurgist who was a professor of material science at Rice
University in Houston with a PhD in metallurgy to testify.261
The metallurgist tried to explain the phenomenon of metal
debris in a patients hip visible on x-ray four months post-op by
looking at the surfaces of the metal-on-metal contact with an
electron microscope to find a source for the visible debris at a
time when companies were denying there was a problem with
MoM hips.262
After studying the implants retrieved from the plaintiffs
hip with an electron microscope, the metallurgist testified that
by some unknown means, particles embedded in the prosthesis
ejected from the prosthesis . . . ultimately leading to failure of
the device, and postulated that the metal particles were being
ejected from the metal-on-metal surface due to inhomogeneity
258. Id.
259. See SARMIENTO, supra note 11, at 28586, and accompanying text.
260. Id.
261. See Sumner v. Biomet, Inc., No. 7:08-CV-00098-HL, 2010 WL 4272341
(M.D. Ga. 2010) (Affidavit of Rex B. McLellan, PhD).
262. Sumner v. Biomet, Inc., No. 7:08-CV-00098-HL, 2010 WL 4736320, at
*1 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 16, 2010), affd, 434 F. Appx 834 (11th Cir. 2011) (Dr.
McLellan stated that the ball of the prosthesis was severely gouged and
scratched, and that there were multiple areas where blocks of metal had
exited the surface.).
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in the chemistry of the cobalt/chromium surfaces. This type of
inhomogeneity is one of the current theories as to why some
MoM hips allegedly failed.263
Under the first Daubert factor, the trial judge noted that
the expert admitted there was no way of testing his theory that
the metal particles were being ejected from the devicea strike
against reliability.264 But how could a plaintiffs expert even get
access to patients to test his theory? He would need access to
multiple patients who were willing to have blood tests drawn
and tests done265 that no one else was doing at a time when a
new device was being introduced with minimum available
information.
Under the second Daubert factor, the judge noted that the
experts technique had never been subjected to peer review nor
publication, and that he had never been involved in a prior case
where this mode of failure was describeda second strike
against reliability.266 But again, this was new technology, with
a completely new mode of failure, caused by a device that had
minimal clinical background propping it up.267 How could he
possibly have been involved in such a prior case unless he was
a consultant of the manufacturer working on research for the
company?
Under the third Daubert factor, there was no known or
potential error rate for his methodology, because the MoM
technology and application of electron microscopy to the
problem was a novel onestrike three.268
Finally, under the fourth Daubert factor, regarding
whether his technique or theory was generally accepted in the
scientific community, the court called strike four.269 The
263. Id. at *46.
264. Id. at *4 (Not having tested his own theory weighs greatly against
the finding of reliability.).
265. See, e.g., FDA, Metal-on-Metal Hip Implants: Concerns About Metal-
on-Metal Hip Implants, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov
/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/ImplantsandProsthetics
/MetalonMetalHipImplants/ucm241604.htm (last updated Apr. 10, 2015)
(discussing some of the diagnostic measures required to identify problems
with MoM joint replacements).
266. See Sumner, 2010 WL 4736320, at *4 (Dr. McLellan has failed to
present any evidence of any peer review of his opinions or theory . . . .).
267. See, e.g., id. at *3.
268. Id. at *5.
269. Id.
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plaintiffs metallurgist testified that no scientist, metallurgist,
physician, or anyone else in the world has ever espoused the
opinion that inhomogeneities in the surface of a device can lead
to ejection of metal fragments, so this novel idea was not
generally accepted in the scientific community.270
The metallurgist stated that the particle ejection theory
relates to a unique problem associated with a specific device,
and that it has not been considered before by the scientific
community.271 The gatekeepers response was that the Court
has a problem with the fact that [plaintiffs expert] never
bothered to test the theory or publish anything about the
theory, adding [i]t is quite difficult for other scientists to peer
review a theory if the creator of the theory does not attempt to
test it or publish anything about it.272 Peer-reviewed articles
take years of experimentation and sometimes additional years
to publish.273 Where novel medical devices are involved
statutes of limitation have run, and devices may have already
been replaced with the next device by the time any peer-
reviewed literature can be published on such a topic. This
would be true even if the researcher could gain access to the
resources and patients to do the research, which they likely
cannot.
The trial judge excluded the metallurgists testimony and
granted summary judgment for the device manufacturer.274
The court emphasized the importance of the fact that [the
metallurgist] developed the particle ejection theory expressly
for the purposes of this case.275 The appellate court affirmed
under the abuse of discretion standard of Daubert.276 If not for
the Joint Registry Databases in the U.K. and Australia,277 it is
likely that MoM hips would have continued to thrive much
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., Caton et al., supra note 85. This study describes outcomes for
patients who received hip replacements twenty-five years prior. Some data
simply cannot follow a litigation timetable.
274. Sumner v. Biomet, Inc., 434 F. Appx 834 (11th Cir. 2011).
275. Sumner, 2010 WL 4736320, at *5.
276. Sumner, 434 F. Appx at 84143; Inadmissible Testimony Dooms Suit
over Hip Implant, 11th Circuit Says, 18 WESTLAW J. MED. DEVICES 2 (2011).
277. See NATL JOINT REGISTRY FOR ENG. AND WALES, cited in
parenthetical supra note 109.
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longer in the United States, despite plaintiffs seeking relief
from the court system.
Judges should allow the jury to hear testimony from
qualified plaintiffs experts without regard to whether the
research was done in preparation for trial in novel orthopaedic
design defect cases because these issues will rarely be
addressed in the peer-reviewed literature until well past
statutes of limitation. Similarly, the significant positive
outcome bias in orthopaedic literature makes it very unlikely
early negative studies will be published.278 The plaintiff should
at least be given a fair shot to present reasonable theories of
failure to the jury in these complex, novel cases on the cutting
edge of medicine.279 The jury can then decide how much weight
and credibility to give the experts testimony based upon
impeachment evidence presented at trial.280
2. Overreliance on Flawed Epidemiology and Under-Reliance
on Experience Testimony
Judicial gatekeepers tend to prejudicially favor
epidemiological reports that inherently benefit the device
industry and disfavor experience testimony that might benefit
the plaintiff.
a. Prejudicial Admission of Flawed Epidemiology Favoring
Industry
Judges overestimate the reliability of epidemiology studies
in the orthopaedic implant industry to the detriment of
plaintiffs. Epidemiology has been described as a field that
concerns itself with finding the causal nexus between external
factors and disease and is generally considered to be the best
evidence of causation in toxic tort actions.281 Although courts
recognize there is not a precise fit between science and legal
burdens of proof, most courts are persuaded that properly
designed and executed epidemiological studies may be part of
the evidence supporting causation in a toxic tort case.282 Some
278. See discussion infra Section C.2.a.
279. Cf. Sumner, 2010 WL 4736320, at *46 (rejecting the plaintiffs
experts report on a motion to exclude).
280. FRE 702 Committee Notes, supra note 208.
281. Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2002).
282. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 717
(Tex. 1997) (emphasis added).
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courts even consider epidemiological evidence to be
indispensable where direct proof of causation is lacking in
toxic tort cases.283
But what if the orthopaedic literature is biased to the point
that epidemiology will always either be positive or nonexistent?
Sources for systematic flaws in the orthopaedic literature in
favor of industry include (1) systemic positive outcome bias, (2)
biased authors, and (3) the fact that the skill level of the
authors does not match skill level of the foreseeable end users
of the devices at issue.284
First, the orthopaedic literature is tainted with an
inherent positive outcome bias that judges should take into
account before becoming too enamored with orthopaedic device
epidemiology studies.285 The unrecognized introduction of
positive outcome bias attributed to systematic reviewslike
epidemiology studiesis considered by some to present a
severe challenge to patient safety.286 Basically, positive studies
get disproportionately published in the surgical literature,
while negative and neutral studies mostly go unpublished.287 A
publication bias toward publishing positive data while
leaving negative studies unpublished systematically
overestimates the clinical relevance of surgical treatments by
disregarding the negative and neutral studies that are not
being published.288 Specifically, one comprehensive seven-year
study found that 74% of published original papers reported
positive outcomes, whereas only 17% reported negative
outcomes, and only 9% reported neutral outcomes.289 One
283. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1128
(2d Cir. 1995).
284. See, e.g., Erik A. Hasenboehler, Bias Towards Publishing Positive
Results in Orthopaedic and General Surgery: A Patient Safety Issue?, 1
PATIENT SAFETY SURGERY art. no. 4 (2007), http://pssjournal.biomedcentral
.com/articles/10.1186/1754-9493-1-4; Meier, supra note 240.
285. Hasenboehler, supra note 284, at 2.
286. Id. (emphasis added); see also Mohit Bhandari, 3rd Meta-Analyses in
Orthopaedic Surgery: A Systematic Review of Their Methodologies, 83 J. BONE
JOINT SURGERY AM. 1524 (2001); David Moher, Epidemiology and Reporting
Characteristics of Systematic Reviews, 4 PLOSMED. 447, 44755 (2007).
287. Hasenboehler, supra note 284, at 34.
288. Id. at 4 ([T]rials with significant results were more likely to be
published than studies with non-significant data, by an adjusted odds-ratio of
12.30.).
289. Id. at 4 fig.2.
254 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 18:1
estimate is that 85% of orthopaedic epidemiology studies may
assert biased conclusions.290
In addition, the underlying studies in the epidemiology
studies are generally weak. In the orthopaedic literature, only
15% of systematic reviews were found to be methodologically
rigorous.291 Good research is apparently the exception rather
than the rule. Only 11.3% of the orthopaedic literature used the
most reliable level of evidence (Level 1) and only 3% of
orthopaedic articles were randomized, controlled trials (the
gold standard for clinical research).292
So why, other than the obvious financial conflicts of
interest of some authors, is there such a high positive outcome
bias in orthopaedic epidemiology studies? Although doctors
have an ethical obligation to warn their peers and patients
about bad devices, they often do not do so.293 Harlan
Krumholz, a professor at Yale School of Medicine, says
[q]uestioning the status quo in medicine is not easy.294 The
standard in the medical community is not to report, said one
doctor who reported a defective heart device.295 Doctors may
fear being sued or being blamed for bad outcomesa fear that
may be well founded based on Dr. Bergers experience with the
Zimmer Flex knee discussed above.296
Berger is far from alone in being blamed for poor outcomes
related to an orthopaedic device. Two years before the ASR
MoM hip recall, a British physicianDr. Antoni Nargolhad a
similar experience when he approached DePuy about problems
his patients were having with the now recalled device.297
Nargol was told by the company that he seemed to be the only
doctor having problems and that there were no other
problems, so he never sounded a public alarm.298 Another
physician to be discussed below, Dr. Lawrence Dorr, likewise
290. Harman Chaudhry et al., How Good Is the Orthopaedic Literature?, 42
INDIAN J. ORTHOPAEDICS 144, 14449 (2008).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Meier, supra note 240.
294. Id.
295. Id. (emphasis added).
296. See id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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was blamed when he reported problems with a device to the
company.299
Because 75%85% of orthopaedic studies will report
positive outcomes, only 15%25% will be neutral or negative;
thus, there is an overwhelming likelihood that any
epidemiology study that combines these underlying studies will
come up with a positive outcome in favor of almost any new
device.300 When you add the factors below, it is a virtual
certainty that epidemiology will favor the defense whether the
device is ultimately defective or not. Therefore, judges should
give extra weight to articles reporting negative or neutral
findings because they likely represent an underreported,
under-published experience.
Second, in addition to positive outcome bias that is
inherent in the orthopaedic literature, the industry gets an
additional boost because its own surgeons often write much of
the early literature regarding new devicesdevices in which
the surgeon is often financially vested with royalties,
consulting fees, and stock options dependent upon the success
of the implant about which they are writing.301 The pressures
and incentives can be huge. For example, when Dr. Berger, the
Zimmer Flex surgeon mentioned above, published his early
data regarding minimally invasive surgery, the Zimmer
chairman and CEO stated in a press release at the time, [w]e
are clearly excited about Dr. Bergers data.302 Zimmers chief
scientific officer praised Berger both as [having] a very clever
set of hands and for his ability to innovate surgical
techniques.303 Berger was featured on ABCs World News
Tonight, trained hundreds of surgeons on Zimmers behalf,
performed 1000 total hips and knees per year, and made $8
million over ten years from Zimmer alone.304 If his initial data
299. Id. (reporting that after publishing an open letter to fellow surgeons
regarding a medical device, Dr. Dorr became the subject of a whisper
campaign that questioned his skills as a surgeon).
300. See Chaudhry et al., supra note 290 (Taken together, this suggests
that nearly 85% of orthopaedic systematic reviews may assert biased
conclusions.)
301. Id. (Although funding may improve reporting practices, the source of
funding always deserves a critical assessment, as industry-funded studies are
significantly more likely to be positive studies with pro-industry outcomes.).
302. Meier, supra note 154.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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had been negative or neutral on minimally invasive surgery, it
seems likely that neither Zimmer nor World News Tonight
would have been as interested.
While Berger was willing to walk away from Zimmer over
his results with the Flex knee, many surgeons likely would
choose not to do so. Some doctors are even willing to publish
falsity for prestige, ego, status, or money.305 Two surgeon
consultants for DePuys ASR hip testified that they received
millions of dollars in royalties from sales and continued to
promote[ ] the device with orthopedic surgeons . . . despite
their knowledge of adverse events and inherent defects in the
ASRs design.306 Remember, 100% of the surgeons with stock
options, 98.4% of those with royalties, and 97.8% of those who
were employees of implant companies reported positive
outcomes in their scientific presentations.307 Thus, reliability is
unlikely when dealing with studies published by the companys
own surgeons, and Daubert requires the judge to exclude
unreliable testimony.
Epidemiology may have played a role in the Zimmer Flex
knee trial outcome. The trial judge admitted the pediatric spine
surgeons epidemiology study along with the paid Zimmer
consultants epidemiology opinions without mentioning any
analysis of underlying positive outcome bias nor underlying
author bias.308 Today, judges should look at the conflict of
interest disclosures for authors of studies used by
epidemiologists and eliminate studies written by highly-paid
industry surgeons and consultants before the epidemiologist
crunches the numbers.
Third, published studies are biased because they are
written by master surgeons using the new implants in high
305. See, e.g., Brendan Borrel, A Medical Madoff: Anesthesiologist Faked
Data in 21 Studies: A Pioneering Anesthesiologist Has Been Implicated in a
Massive Research Fraud That Has Altered the Way Millions of Patients Are
Treated for Pain During and After Orthopaedic Surgeries, SCI. AM. (Mar. 10,
2009), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-medical-madoff-anesthestes
iologist-faked-data/.
306. Bruera, supra note 76, at 38.
307. Okike et al., supra note 234.
308. In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-C-
5468, 2015 WL 5050214, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2015) (Though the court
shares some of Plaintiffs concerns, it ultimately concludes that Dr. Vitales
testimony would assist the jury and will be sufficiently reliable. The motion to
bar his testimony will be denied.)
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volume practices, whereas design defect law applies to
reasonably foreseeable use of the product in light of [its]
nature and intended function.309 Seventy-five percent of total
hip replacements are performed by surgeons who do fewer than
twenty-five total hip operations per year, and 25% of total knee
operations are done by surgeons who perform fewer than twelve
total knees per year.310 Thus, it is reasonably foreseeable that
total joint replacements will be implanted by surgeons with
considerably less experience and expertise than the master
surgeons who write the articles and design the implantsthe
super experts.
Yet, implant companies rarely, if ever, publish studies
assessing outcomes with their devices in the hands of the
average surgeon. The vast majority of orthopaedic procedures
in the United States are not performed by master,
industry-insider surgeonsyet virtually all of the orthopaedic
literature is written about those doctors patients. By analogy,
just because Michael Jordan can score thirty-one points per
game does not mean that an average NBA player can do the
same. Similarly, just because a gifted master surgeon can
obtain reasonable outcomes with a new device that he helped
design does not mean the average surgeon using the device for
the masses will have similar results. The company should have
some duty to look into the effectiveness of their design in the
hands of those who are most likely to do the majority of the
procedures: the average surgeon. At the very least, courts have
a duty to recognize the resultant added positive outcome bias,
and then interpret epidemiology studies with an appropriate
level of skepticism.
In summary, courts should become less enamored with
epidemiology because of systemic positive outcome bias,
conflicts of interest of the authors of underlying studies, and
309. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2, cmt. m; Defective
and Unreasonably Dangerous Condition of Product, supra note 189, § 17:5.
310. S. Rodriguez-Elizalde et al., Provider Volumes and Surgical Outcomes
in Total Hip and Knee Replacement, in 37 RECENT ADVANCES IN
ARTHROPLASTY 35, 37 (Samo K. Fokter ed., 2012), http://www.intechopen.com
/books/recent-advances-in-arthroplasty/provider-volumes-and-surgical-
outcomes-in-total-hip-and-knee-replacement (reporting data for the 75%
group); Jeffrey N. Katz et al., Association Between Hospital and Surgeon
Procedure Volume and the Outcomes of Total Knee Replacement, 86 J. BONE &
JOINT SURG. AM. 1909, 1909 (2004), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed
/15342752 (reporting results data for the 25% group).
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because the results likely do not represent the foreseeable
application of the devices in the real world by the average
surgeon.
b. Prejudicial Exclusion of Experience Testimony
Experience testimony is one of the few weapons in
plaintiffs arsenals, yet judges often unnecessarily and
prejudicially disfavor experience testimony when little else is
even possible in novel new device design cases.311 Most of the
orthopaedic device makers are located in the small town of
Warsaw, Indiana (population 13,559).312 Because industry
design experts are unlikely to risk their careers by testifying
against their benefactors, the plaintiff will generally be stuck
choosing from the pool of experts who are not working in the
orthopaedic implant industry.313 Consequently, the plaintiffs
experts will generally not have access to patients upon whom to
perform randomized, controlled trials.314 Nor will the plaintiffs
experts generally have access to independent patient clinical
follow-up data for the device at issue upon which to base his or
her testimony (except in the rare instance where an overseas
database is involvedlike in the MoM hip cases).315 The
plaintiffs experts probably wont have an indexed population of
patients who have undergone treatment with the device, or
even a different device to compare. Thus, personal experience
and research performed in preparation for the litigation may
often be the sole basis for reliable expert testimony in these
complex, novel cases.
The Rules do not disfavor experience witnesses. To the
contrary, it is quite clear that experience is enough, because
311. See, e.g., GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 620 (Tex.
1999) (Where . . . the issue involves only . . . experience rather than expertise,
it is within the province of the jury to decide, and admission of expert
testimony . . . is error.).
312. Feder, supra note 205.
313. Cf. Phillip J. Kolczynski, Ethical Challenges for Experts in Civil
Litigation, EXPERT PAGES, http://expertpages.com/news/ethical_challenges
_for_experts_i.htm ([A]n expert who changes sides on social or economic
issues runs the risk of being black-listed or black-balled by the industry in
which he previously worked.) (last visited Oct. 1, 2016).
314. See id.
315. See id.; NATL JOINT REGISTRY FOR ENG. AND WALES, cited in
parenthetical supra note 109.
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the 2000 amendment and Committee notes on Rule 702
specifically say:
Nothing in this amendment is intended to suggest that experience
aloneor experience in conjunction with other knowledge, skill,
training or educationmay not provide a sufficient foundation for
expert testimony. To the contrary, the text of Rule 702 expressly
contemplates that an expert may be qualified on the basis of
experience. In certain fields, experience is the predominant, if not
sole, basis for a great deal of reliable expert testimony.316
Thus, clearly the Rules contemplate cases like orthopaedic
implant design cases where experience testimony might be the
sole or predominant source of reliable expert testimony for a
party.
Yet courts frequently exclude the operating surgeons
design defect opinions based on personal experience with the
device and confine his or her testimony to treatment issues,
saying the treating physician may not offer an expert opinion,
even one formed during the course of treatment . . . .317 Board
certified orthopaedic surgeons complete five years of specialized
residency training and often an additional year of subspecialty
fellowship training; thereafter, they continue to read the
orthopaedic literature, take recertification examinations, and
meet certification guidelines that require at least forty hours of
continuing medical education annually attending meetings and
listening to presentations where they often learn of the very
devices at issue in the litigation.318 If they are qualified to
implant the device into human beings, they should be qualified
to proffer opinions regarding the design features of the devices
that they have personally used.
Further, the operating surgeon represents the foreseeable
target user for the devices intended use, so his or her opinion is
particularly relevant and reliable with regard to how the
design functions in the hands of the end user. In contrast to the
master surgeons who write the literature and are usually
industry insiders, typical operating surgeons perform the
majority of these procedures. Their expert observations are
relevant and should be deemed reliable in determining design
defects. Where the implant company blames the operating
316. FRE 702 Committee Notes, supra note 208 (emphasis added).
317. Morritt v. Stryker Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d 177, 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
318. See, e.g., AM. BD. OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY, Maintenance of
Certification, https://www.abos.org/moc.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 2016).
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surgeon for the plaintiffs complications, the surgeon should
especially be allowed to present his or her alternative theories
of causationincluding design defect.
In the bellwether Zimmer Flex knee case, the judge
excluded experience testimony from two key plaintiff experts.
First, she excluded the operating surgeons testimony
regarding design defect, even though the defendants experts
were allowed to blame the surgeon for causing the device
failure by claiming he hadnt properly secured the implants in
place.319 Thus, the jury only got to hear one side of the story
directly from the parties involvedhearing the defendants
theory as to why the device failed (i.e., the surgeon did a bad
job), but not the operating surgeons theory (i.e., possibly, the
device was defectively designed).320 Second, she barred
experience testimony proffered by a well-qualified NYU
orthopaedic professor who was performing over 100 total knees
per year.321 Amazingly, while barring experience testimony for
the plaintiff, computer simulation testimony for the defense
was allowed.322 Overzealous exclusion of plaintiffs experience
experts likely has a chilling effect on just adjudication of
orthopaedic design defect cases where plaintiffs must often rely
on the testimony of personal experience experts using these
novel devices.
3. Prejudicial Deference to Industry Polycentricity Arguments
Judges should neither accept industry arguments that
design decisions are too complex for adjudication nor give
special deference to the companies design decisions. Instead,
the companies substantial equivalence decisionswhich
measure the leap from the last proven predicate to the device
at issuecan serve as the measure of the amount of acceptable
allowable latitude for plaintiff expert theories. Any argument
319. Sundar, supra note 180; see also In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-C-5468, 2015 WL 3799534, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 17,
2015) (precluding the doctor from opining regarding the particular forces and
stresses at work on the knee, the adequacy of Zimmers testing, or whether the
design of the knee caused Ms. Battys loosening).
320. See generally In re Zimmer, 2015 WL 3799534.
321. In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-C-
5468, 2015 WL 3669933, at *19 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 2015).
322. See In re Zimmer NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-C-
5468, 2015 WL 4880953 at *23 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2015); Baker, supra note
177.
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that orthopaedic devices are unavoidably unsafe should also
be summarily dismissed in todays mature market, because
many safe devices are already in use.
a. The Companys Substantial Equivalence Decisions and
Predicate Chain Should Serve as the Template for
Adjudication of Reasonable Alternative Design Theories
Judges may be improperly influenced to defer to industry
by commentators who conclude that the polycentric nature of
design defect litigation involving medical devices demands
that the courts stay their hand and permit the manufacturers
managerial safety decision to governespecially when it
comes to plaintiffs offering reasonable alternative designs
(RADs) of complex medical devices.323 One prominent author
claims, [t]he contention that this multifaceted and
interconnected process is not fit for judicial determination is
most persuasive when an alternative design suggested by the
plaintiff would significantly alter the design of the product.324
So manufacturers are likely to argue that design decisions are
polycentric or aspects of product design [are] related in such
a way that any design change would substantially affect the
cost, utility, [or] safety of the device.325 At least one judge
described prescription drug design defect cases as impossibly
polycentric:
If one strand is pulled, a complex pattern of readjustments will occur
throughout the entire web. If another strand is pulled, the
relationships among all the strands will again be readjusted. A
lawyer seeking to base [an] argument upon established principle and
required to address himself in discourse to each of a dozen strands,
or issues, would find [the] task frustratingly impossible.326
However, the same author notes that [e]ven though
polycentric problems are not suited to adjudication, it does not
follow that they are incapable of rational resolution.327 One
323. Aaron D. Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectation:
Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 861, 867 (1983); see also James A. Henderson Jr., Judicial
Review of Manufacturers Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of
Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973).
324. Twerski, supra note 323, at 891.
325. Twerski, supra note 188, at 527.
326. Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 98 (Utah 1991) (quoting
Henderson, supra note 323) (editing in original).
327. Henderson, supra note 323, at 1538.
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court noted, [l]aw lags science; it does not lead it.328 However,
law can surely try to distinguish science from marketing.
Fortunately for the judge in an orthopaedic implant design
case, the defendant has supplied a map for rational resolution
of RAD polycentricity questionsthe liberties taken during the
FDA approval process, and the differences between the device
at issue and its predicate device used by the company to meet
substantial equivalence standards. The products predicate
chain (the series of leaps from predicate to predicate upon
which the device obtained FDA clearance) should serve as the
template for judges to determine how much flexibility to give
plaintiffs experts in proffering RADs and offering speculative
testimony.
If the products substantially equivalent predicate is a
very close approximation of the device in question and the
predicate has a proven track record for safety and efficacy, then
the plaintiffs expert should be allowed little latitude. However,
if the device at question takes a speculative leap of faith from
the predicate device based on only theories, or if the predicate
device is unproven (or worse, failed), then the plaintiffs expert
should be given plenty of flexibility to proffer similar
speculative theories and leaps of faith. As one jurist noted,
[t]he courtroom is not the place for scientific guesswork, even
of the inspired sort329a maxim that applies equally to
defendants who base design decisions on inspired guesswork
leaps from weak predicate foundations when taking the FDAs
substantial equivalence shortcut. For example, the ASR MoM
hip system was reportedly cleared by the FDA based on three
predicate devices originating prior to 1976including the
McKee-Farrar, Ring, and Sivash MoM hip implantsall of
which were reportedly removed from the market due to high
revision rates.330 In this case, if the devices predicate chain is
based on devices with high failure rates, then plaintiffs experts
should be given significant, reasonable latitude in proposing
RADs and other design defect theories.
328. Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996).
329. Id.
330. Bruera, supra note 76, at 36; see also Ardaugh et al., supra note 106.
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b. Where Good Alternatives Already Exist, the Argument that
Medical Devices are Unavoidably Unsafe Should Be
Summarily Dismissed
Device manufacturers should fail in their arguments that
their wares are unavoidably unsafe where they have taken
the substantial equivalence shortcut, and especially where
there are safe alternatives already on the market. Comment k
of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines
unavoidably unsafe products as some products which, in the
present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being
made safe for their intended and ordinary use.331 Comment k
specifically mentions drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of
which . . . cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under
the prescription of a physician.332 Comment k goes on to note
that the seller of such products is not to be held to strict
liability.333
Orthopaedic device manufacturers have tried to extend the
immunity given drugs to medical devicesdownplaying the
vast differences in the FDA approval processes between drugs
and medical devices.334 Where a drug is approved after three
sets of clinical trials, the argument that it is unavoidably
unsafe may have merit. But, where a medical device is cleared
after only twenty hours335 of paperwork declaring substantial
equivalence to a predicate that may have even failed, there
simply has not been enough testing to argue with any merit
that the device is unavoidably unsafe. There may have been no
significant effort made to make it safe in the first place since
the effort may have been only to declare it substantially
equivalent.
A Pennsylvania court actually bought the unavoidably
unsafe argument with regard to total knee replacement tibial
331. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. k (AM. LAW INST.
1965).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Shield Medical Devices from Lawsuits,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2008) http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/washington
/21device.html (Makers of medical devices like implantable defibrillators or
breast implants are immune from liability for personal injuries as long as
the Food and Drug Administration approved the device before it was marketed
and it meets the agencys specifications.).
335. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (noting that the
510(k) notification process is completed in an average of only twenty hours).
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inserts, and ruled that prescription medical devices were
unavoidably unsafe such that manufacturers of medical
devices are effectively immune from strict liability suit in
Pennsylvania.336 The logic was based on the idea that there
was no reason why the same [unavoidably unsafe] rational[e]
applicable to prescription drugs may not be applied to medical
devicesevidently failing to recognize the vast differences in
the FDA approval process for drugs versus medical devices.337
If a device company takes the device through the premarket
approval process (PMA) which more closely approximates the
FDA clearance method used for drugs, then state law causes of
action are already likely preempted by federal law338so the
company can choose the PMA pathway and get even better
liability protection than Comment k. However, if the company
chooses the substantial equivalence pathway, they likely have
not put forth enough effort to declare the lack of safety
unavoidable.
At least one orthopaedic device manufacturer argued in a
MoM hip case that holding the company strictly liable under
products liability law would contradict the strong public policy
encouraging developments in medical treatment, noting that
Texas has recognized Comment k for prescription drugs, and
should do so for medical devices.339 The Plaintiff wisely pointed
out that the FDA approval process for prescription drugs is
drastically different from the FDAs 510(k) process.340 The
case survived summary judgment, but the court did not exclude
the possibility of applying Comment k at a later stage of the
proceedings.341
The idea that hip replacements are unavoidably unsafe,
given the long term success of Charnleys hips and other metal
336. Soufflas v. Zimmer, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 737, 749 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
337. Id. at 750.
338. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 470 (invoking the preemption provisions of 21
U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012), which prevent supplementation or contradiction of
federal law relating to safety or effectiveness of medical devices); Reigel v.
Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (similar preemption discussion).
339. Anastasi v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1040 (E.D.
Mo. 2014).
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1041 (The Court finds Defendants Comment k argument is
prematurely brought in their Motion to Dismiss.).
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on polyethylene models, is far-fetched.342 Most jurisdictions
rule that only if the products benefits exceed its risks and it is
incapable of being made safer are Comment ks protections
available.343 Total hips are clearly being made safely and have
many years of proven safety records.344 Orthopaedic devices
approved by the 510(k) approval process and those in
categories where there are already safe devices should not be
declared unavoidably unsafe.
IV. JUDGES SHOULD CORRECT PREJUDICIAL DAUBERT
TENDENCIES FAVORING DEFENDANTS IN
ORTHOPAEDIC DESIGN DEFECT CASES AS A MATTER
OF PUBLIC POLICY
Unproven substantially equivalent devices often offer
society nothing more than higher costs with no improvement in
outcomes over existing devices in mature orthopaedic implant
markets, and sometimes these devices lead to unnecessary,
costly complications.345 Device manufacturers often blame the
operating surgeon for the failures.346 This may lead to
tendencies for the legal system to shift the burden for unproven
devices onto the medical malpractice system and the healthcare
system as a whole, because lawyers may choose to pursue less
complex and more common medical malpractice claims over
very complex design defect claims in an unfavorable Daubert
environment.347 As a public policy matter, implant companies
are in a much better position than surgeons, patients, and the
general public to reduce the hazards inherent in their unproven
devices; the manufacturer can choose better premarket testing,
342. See, e.g., Neumann et al., supra note 2; Caton et al., supra note 85;
Callaghan et al., supra note 86, at 261721.
343. See DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, 2 OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 19:5 (4th ed. 2014).
344. See, e.g., Neumann et al., supra note 2; Caton et al., supra note 85;
Callaghan et al., supra note 86, at 261721.
345. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478 (1996) (defining the
501(k) process as allowing an alternative to the PMA process for devices
substantially equivalent to devices already on the market).
346. See, e.g.,Meier, supra note 154 (Dr. Berger blamed); Meier, supra note
240 (reporting that Dr. Dorr was the victim of a whisper campaign).
347. In 2010, medical malpractice costs totaled approximately $29.8 billion
in the United States. See WILLIS TOWERS WATSON, 2011 UPDATE ON U.S.
TORT COST TRENDS 10, 17 (January 2012), https://www.towerswatson.com/en-
US/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2012/01/2011-Update-on-US-
Tort-Cost-Trends (providing a link to a downloadable PDF report).
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use the PMA approval process as a federal preemption shield,
and perform postmarket surveillance on its devices.
A. IMPLANT COMPANIES BLAME SHIFTING TO OPERATING
SURGEONSMAY INFLUENCE ATTORNEYS TO CHOOSEMEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS OVERMORE COMPLEX DESIGN DEFECT
CLAIMS IN AN UNFAVORABLEDAUBERT ENVIRONMENT
As evidenced above, implant companies generally have no
qualms with throwing operating surgeons to the wolves when it
comes to assigning blame for the failure of medical devices.348
Even their most decorated, loyal surgeons are fair fodder to be
sacrificed to the courts.349 For design defects that cause early
failures within the medical malpractice statute of limitations,
physicians malpractice policies are a more viable target for
plaintiffs lawyers than complex design defect cases.350
Even the most ardent industry insiders and consultants
are blamed for device failures by the companies. Remember,
Dr. Richard Berger in the Zimmer Flex case went from being a
company star with clever . . . hands and a master teacher to
someone who didnt know what he was doing when he
reported early concerns with a device.351 Dr. Lawrence Dorr
had a similar experience when he alerted Zimmer about bad
outcomes with one of its total hip sockets (i.e., the Durom®
acetabular cup).352 According to his website, Dr. Dorr has
performed more than 3,500 hip and knee replacements in the
past decade and is the president of the Hip Societya
prestigious organization of hip surgeons consisting of the top
100 hip surgeons in the world.353 Dr. Dorr founded the
Masters Series meetings to educate orthopaedic surgeons
while he was a professor at the University of Southern
California with the backing of multiple device manufacturers
(including Zimmer, DePuy, Stryker, Smith & Nephew, and
348. See, e.g., supra note 346.
349. Id.
350. See, e.g., WILLIS TOWERSWATSON, supra note 347.
351. Meier, supra note 154.
352. See Lawrence Dorr, Memo to the American Association of Hip and
Knee Surgeons, SURFACE HIPPY (Apr. 22, 2008), http://surfacehippy.info/dr-
dorr-memo-to-american-association-of-hip-and-knee-surgeons-about-the-
durom-cup-by-zimmer/; Meier, supra note 240.
353. DORR ARTHRITIS INST., Dr. Lawrence Dorr, http:// www
.dorrarthritisinstitute.org/dorr.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2016).
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Biomet).354 He has been designing hip and knee implants since
1982 and has been paid millions of dollars in royalties for his
devices.355
In 2008, Dr. Dorr warned other orthopaedic surgeons in an
open letter to the American Association of Hip and Knee
Surgeons that his patients were experiencing what he
apparently considered an unusual number (14 of 165 hips) of
revisions or impending revisions with the companys hip socket
within the first two years after surgery.356 After the letter, Dr.
Dorr became the subject of a whisper campaign [questioning]
his skills as a surgeon.357 Dr. Dorr says that when a surgeon
reports a problem with a device, [t]he first thing that a
company does is to put out a campaign that a surgeon does not
know how to operate noting that the smear campaign hurt
[his] practice for a year.358 Dr. Dorr said the company told him
no other surgeons were having any problems.359 Two prominent
surgeons eventually came to Dr. Dorrs defense noting similar
issues, but the damage was already done to Dr. Dorrs
practice.360
Since they willingly blame their master surgeons, it
should come as no surprise that implant companies often blame
other operating surgeons for device failuressometimes
perhaps rightfully, but sometimes likely wrongfully based upon
Dorrs experience. In the recent DePuy Pinnacle MoM case, the
company blamed the operating surgeon, saying the hip implant
was improperly positioned.361 Likewise, in the bellwether
Zimmer Flex knee case, Zimmer blamed the operating surgeon
saying he hadnt properly secured the implants in place.362 In
those two cases, the jury decided whether to believe the
companys blame-shifting, but the ease and frequency of blame-
shifting in these products liability cases may convince many
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Dorr, supra note 352.
357. Meier, supra note 240.
358. Id.
359. See Meier, supra note 154 (stating that Zimmer asserted the problem
was [instead with] Dr. Dorrs technique).
360. Id.
361. Johnson & Johnsons DePuy Wins First Trial over Pinnacle Hips:
Herlihy-Paoli v. DePuy Orthopaedics, supra note 120, at 1.
362. Sundar, supra note 180.
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plaintiffs lawyers to pursue medical malpractice cases against
surgeons instead of products liability cases against device
makers.
Surgeons (and hospitals363) may thus be bearing much of
the financial burden of inadequately tested medical devices
through blame-shifting tactics by the medical device industry
that encourage plaintiffs lawyers to go after doctors and
hospitals with medical malpractice claims, instead of device
manufacturers with products liability complaints.
B. FROM A PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE, IMPLANT
MANUFACTURERS ARE IN THE BEST POSITION TO REDUCE THE
HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH UNPROVEN ORTHOPAEDIC DEVICES
AND TOMANAGE THE ASSOCIATED COSTS
[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
health inherent in defective products that reach the market.364
Implant companies are in the best position as a matter of
public policy to manage the risks and costs associated with
releasing unproven orthopaedic devices into the market: the
manufacturer has the opportunity to choose better premarket
testing, to use the PMA approval process as a federal
preemption shield, and to perform postmarket surveillance on
its devices.365
First, better premarket testing is an option available to
implant companies that is not available to surgeons, patients,
or the general public. For medical devices in particular,
manufacturer[s] can anticipate some hazards and guard
against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.366 The
public is helpless to detect hidden design defects in devices that
have been inadequately tested or based upon faulty predicate
363. E.g., Harrison v. Slidell Specialty Hosp., No. 2013 CA 0691, 2013 WL
6858261 (La. Ct. App. 2013), writ denied, 138 So.3d 606 (La. 2014) at 78
(holding that a plaintiff can bring a cause of action against the hospital in
which the faulty device was implanted).
364. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 44041 (Cal. 1944).
365. Cf. IOM REPORT, supra note 69, at 511 (describing the PMA and
501(k) processes, and recommendations for the industry that include
postmarket surveillance); id. at 13742 (discussing non-FDA postmarket
surveillance).
366. Escola, 150 P.2d at 44041.
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devices.367 When 88% percent of orthopaedic devices are
reaching the market via the 510(k) shortcut versus only 53% of
other medical devices, orthopaedic device manufacturers are
apparently making conscious decisions to put the public at
unnecessary risk of injury, knowing there is a markedly higher
risk of device recall (11.5 times) and injury than if they did
premarket trials and obtained clearance through the PMA
process.368
The lack of premarket testing is particularly disturbing
when there are already safe and effective devices on the
market. Market deterrence theory dictates that manufacturers
who use marketing ploys, instead of scientific testing, to create
demand for risky products should pay the price when the
devices fail.369 Public health and well-being is promoted by
discouraging the marketing of products having defects that
are a menace to the public.370 Companies that replace effective
devices with ineffective, more expensive, and riskier devices
are particularly menacing to the public and should foot the bill
for the failures.371
Second, orthopaedic device manufacturers can choose
federal preemption to insure against design defect liability
risks by choosing the PMA pathway to FDA clearance, instead
of 510(k) and substantial equivalence.372 Fewer device recalls
(11.5 times fewer) under the PMA pathway will lead to lower
costs of healthcare associated with the recalled devices and
likely lower cost of malpractice cases against surgeons.373 If
healthcare costs of complications and malpractice are reduced,
the system may be able to pay enough to offset the added cost
367. Id.
368. Day et al., supra note 65, at 517.
369. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time
Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919, 93139 (1981)
(discussing the Traditional Justifications for Strict Products Liability).
370. Escola, 150 P.2d at 441.
371. Cf. Freeman, supra note 75, at 139 (The unknown risks that Class III
devices pose when they are cleared with inadequate predicates is an unethical
burden that patients should not have to bear.).
372. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478 (1996) (invoking the
preemption provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a), which prevent supplementation
or contradiction of federal law relating to safety or effectiveness of medical
devices); Reigel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (similar preemption
discussion).
373. See Day et al., supra note 65, at 517.
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to the company of the premarket testing involved in the PMA
process.374
Thus, the PMA process may spread the cost of injuries over
all users of the devices so that the companies research and
development costs can be insured by the manufacturer and
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.375
Otherwise, in an unfavorable Daubert environment, [t]he cost
of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured.376 Further, if
the devices are cleared by the PMA process, society in the
future may truly be talking about the cutting edge of
orthopaedics instead of the marketing edge of big business
so going forward the public may benefit from true scientific
advancement instead of shiny, new implants in velvet boxes
hawked by salesmen instead of scientists.
Finally, postmarket surveillance of medical devices was
recommended by the Institute of Medicine as part of the
replacement of the 510(k) process.377 One example of
postmarket surveillancetotal joint registrieshas been
around in other countries for years,378 and is finally beginning
in the United States.379 The U.K. and Australian joint
registries played a major role in detecting the problems
associated with metal-on-metal hips.380 Postmarket
surveillance of all new orthopaedic devices should be
implemented as recommended by the IOM, and joint registries
can serve as a model for implementation. In addition to
detecting problems early, companies stand to benefit by
improving future designs where doctor and patient feedback
can be factored into future design changes.
374. See generally WILLIS TOWERS WATSON, supra note 347 (noting that
medical malpractice costs in 2010 were nearly $30 billion).
375. Escola, 150 P.2d at 441.
376. Id.; see, e.g., In re Wagner, 530 B.R. 695, 697 (E.D. Wis. 2015)
(describing the debtor as suffering from a failed hip surgery, which debtor
blamed for her bankruptcy).
377. IOM REPORT, supra note 69, at 910.
378. David Ayers & Patricia Franklin, Joint Replacement Registries in the
United States: A New Paradigm, 96 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY AM. 1567, 1568
(2014), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4159967/.
379. Id.; see Improving Orthopaedic Care Through Data, AM. JOINT
REPLACEMENT REG., http://www.ajrr.net (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
380. See Ardaugh et al., supra note 106, at 98.
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V. CONCLUSION
Orthopaedic medical devices have improved the health of
countless Americans. However, device companies cause
unnecessary harm to patients when they put marketing ahead
of science, leaving behind proven devices for unproven
speculative marketing schemes. Orthopaedic surgery patients
are particularly vulnerable because there are multiple signs
that industry may be the tail wagging the proverbial
medicine dogincluding signs of corruption (e.g., fines,
settlements, prison), striking unexplainable shifts in device
use, and disproportionate use of the substantial equivalence
pathway to device clearance.
Expert testimony is vital in orthopaedic design cases. A
close look at some recent orthopaedic design cases supports the
idea that judges are being too deferential in admitting defense
experts while being overzealous in excluding plaintiffs experts.
The prejudicial Daubert rulings appear to be related to judges
overestimating the reliability of orthopaedic epidemiology
studies and of experts with million dollar conflicts of interest,
while simultaneously underestimating the reliability of novel
research performed in preparation for trial and of experts who
testify based on personal experience. In addition, judges may
ignore device industry polycentricity issues created by the
substantial equivalence determination while deferring to
industry on polycentricity grounds when analyzing plaintiffs
design theories.
The end result of the current system is that orthopaedic
implant companies are making an economic business decision
to release their devices using only substantial equivalence to
gain clearance at a markedly higher rate than other medical
devices (88%, vs. 53%)choosing to simply absorb the current
litigation costs associated with the 11.5 times higher device
recall rate.381 The economic calculus needs to change in order to
encourage more investment in device safety and efficacy prior
to release. The orthopaedic implant industry is in the best
position to reduce the hazards associated with unproven
medical devices, through use of premarket testing, by utilizing
federal preemption protection through the PMA pathway, and
through postmarket surveillance. When surgeons take the
blame, higher malpractice premiums may add to the financial
381. Day et al., supra note 65, at 517.
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burdens of the health care system. When patients have more
complications related to recalled devices, the public and
patients pay more through higher healthcare costs, and
through lost wages and poor health.
In many ways, the current prejudicial Daubert approach
favoring industry facilitates a kind of bodily eminent
domain382 claim, by which the orthopaedic implant industry
feels entitled to the taking of Americans health in the name
of profits. Judges can do a better job in providing for just
adjudication of complex orthopaedic design defect cases by
understanding and accounting for the issues discussed in this
paper.
382. GAWANDE, supra note 7.
